Problems of Communism

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The Twentieth Congress and After

Editors' Note: The three articles below continue *Problems of Communism's* series of commentaries on developments in the USSR and on the international scene since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, held in Moscow last February. Eclipsing all other repercussions of the Congress was the publication in June of leaked portions of Khrushchev's secret speech of February 25th—a scathing defamation of Stalin which laid the sins of a quarter-century of misrule and repression at the late dictator's door. The first article below analyzes the various implications of Khrushchev's charges and attempts to assess the party leadership's motives in airing these revelations of Stalinist terrorism before the party assemblage.

A second article by the British political analyst Richard Lowenthal examines the no less significant—if less sensational—Congress pronouncements sanctioning the pursuit of "socialism" by other paths than the Leninist pattern of revolutionary overthrow. The author sees Moscow's talk of a "peaceful" or "parliamentary" road to socialism not merely as a move to promote a new phase of Popular Front tactics, but as part of a revival of Kremlin interest in world revolution—by any means which might lead to the establishment of Communist power in new areas.

In the third article, British M. P. Denis Healey discusses the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Great Britain in April, showing the patent failure, in this instance, of Soviet efforts to curry popular favor for the broad front tactic.

Anatomy of Tyranny:

*Mr. Khrushchev's Attack on Stalin**

RARELY has a document aroused more interest and speculation than the paper issued by the US State Department, purporting to be the text of the speech delivered on February 25, 1956 by Mr. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Twentieth Congress. The United States Government does not vouch for its authenticity; nevertheless it has been received everywhere as plausible; it is in keeping with the tenor of statements made by responsible officials of non-Soviet Communist parties, and Communist newspapers in the West have made no attempt to denounce it as a forgery. On the contrary, they have treated it as genuine.

To read this paper is to recall a dozen highlights of Soviet history between the assassination of Kirov in 1934 and Stalin's death in 1953. Of these two events, the first is presented in a highly equivocal light, suggesting a plot by the secret police in collusion with Stalin, the second as a release from unparallelled tyranny. Overshadowing all the rest is the somber horror of the great purge of the later 1930's.

The ostensible purpose of the speech was to destroy Stalin's reputation, or, in its own terms, to destroy the "cult of the individual." Mr. Khrushchev's

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picture of the Soviet Union between 1934 and 1953, as given here, bears a startling resemblance to the more lurid efforts of the extreme anti-Communist school. They, too, spoke of Stalin's dictatorship by terror, of mass injustice, of the execution of thousands of innocents, of cringing judges and confessions extorted by torture to crimes that were never committed, of the distortion of history, of the paralyzing rule of fear—all of it smothered under choking clouds of servile adulation.

In contrast to Lenin, Mr. Khrushchev is alleged to have said, Stalin "abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions, and terror." Whoever opposed him was "doomed to moral and physical annihilation." But not only those who opposed him. Stalin used terror against "many honest Communists, against those party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the civil war and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization." It was enough to be "suspected of hostile intent." Mass arrests and executions without trial "created conditions of insecurity, fear, and even desperation"; in his "intolerance and brutality" Stalin condemned to summary death many thousands who had committed no crimes at all, but who were forced to confess to the most "unlikely crimes" by the use of "cruel and inhuman tortures." The military collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court is now reviewing these cases. Since 1954 it has "rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously."

Stalin is also declared to have been responsible for "the mass deportation from their native places of whole nations." These actions were "not dictated by any military considerations"; others, by implication, were, and it is therefore not surprising that Mr. Khrushchev did not include in his list of the uprooted the Volga Germans, the Poles, and the Balts. For these, apparently, the Stalin regime is not yet at an end.

To attribute to Stalin alone the responsibility for these and innumerable other acts is to carry the cult of the individual far indeed. It imposes too great a strain on credulity to believe that for twenty years one man could terrorize 200 million, while his colleagues in the party, the government and the army remained utterly helpless. Mr. Khrushchev deplored the tendency to "elevate one person, transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god"; yet in his own fashion this is precisely what he himself has done.

Mr. Khrushchev's was a curious contention for a Marxist. No revolutionary of Tsarist days would have accepted as a reason for inactivity the plea that the tyrant "treated all others in such a way that they could only listen and praise him"; or that "a situation was created where one could not express one's own will." It is tantamount to an admission that the revolutionary terror had succeeded—where Tsarist persecution had failed—in destroying the spirit and traditions of the party which elevates revolution against oppressors to the highest level of social obligation.

The alternative plea of ignorance, of Stalin's failure to convene the Central Committee, or to inform his colleagues of action about to be taken, cannot even have been intended seriously; it might have some validity for a few months, but not for twenty years. The present rulers of the USSR, saw their colleagues, their superiors, and their subordinates fall by the thousand. It is difficult to believe that they had to wait for Stalin's death to learn that the victims were innocent. In any case, the plea of ignorance cannot be advanced to excuse inactivity when, on Mr. Khrushchev's own showing, Stalin's policies threatened the country, in the opinion of the Army chiefs, with immense losses and dangers during the war. (Neither ignorance nor obedience to orders was accepted as a valid plea at Nuremberg; in his final speech there the chief Soviet Prosecutor, General Rudenko, said that the Nazi leaders "were necessary to Hitler just as much as he was necessary to them. Goering, Frick, Rosenberg . . . are inconceivable without Hitler, just as Hitler is inconceivable without them".) [1]

In fact, neither plea was meant to be taken at face value. Mr. Khrushchev was not talking to a gathering of schoolchildren, but to his country's outstanding political figures. What he was saying in effect was that they were *all* equally responsible. As witnesses and accomplices, none had the right to claim a preeminence on moral or historical grounds. If there was collective leadership, there was also collective guilt.

There were two interesting exceptions. Mr. Khrushchev appeared to go out of his way to suggest that Mr. Malenkov's guilt was greater than average by recalling two occasions during the war when he acted as Stalin's spokesman, and to display in a favorable light Marshal Zhukov, whom Stalin denigrated. (Mr. Malenkov, it may be remembered, was highly critical of Khrushchev's agricultural policies at the Nineteenth Congress in 1952.)

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[1] *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XXII, p. 358 (Nuremberg, 1948).

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Why was the risk taken of bringing the details of this nightmare of tyranny out into the open? Why not have continued the policy of silence which was pursued up to the Twentieth Congress, while eradicating the worst abuses of the earlier years? For three years the party leaders had been cautiously refashioning many facets of Soviet society, executing or getting rid of leading officials of the secret police, encouraging local initiative, loosening the stranglehold that had virtually killed the arts, and generally reducing the extreme tensions and fears of the Stalin era. It might have been thought that this was a settled policy, which would be followed until the present itself denied the past and the dead tyrant's name sank unremarked into oblivion without explicit disavowal.

There is no convincing answer to be found in the "objective situation," for reasons that were valid in the spring of 1956 were equally valid three years earlier. The answer can lie only in the situation *within* the Communist Party, and here there are only slender indications to support speculation.

In the published records of the Twentieth Congress there is only one speech which departed from the practice of silent repudiation. That is the speech of Mikoyan which contained the first explicit attack on Stalin. It seems reasonable to assume either that this section of Mikoyan's speech came as a surprise to his colleagues, or that it had been inserted by agreement "to test audience reaction"—the first being the more likely. It was presumably a step in the maneuvering for position within the leadership. The popularity of the measures taken after Stalin's death to mitigate the harshness of the regime suggested that support could be won by the open denunciation of its chief architect, and if prestige was to be enhanced by these means, Mr. Khrushchev was unlikely to allow it to be won by a colleague. The response to Mikoyan's attack probably convinced the party Presidium that the risks were smaller than they had supposed. (There is in fact a strong suggestion, implicit in the parentheses which occur in the report of the speech indicating the mood of the audience,

Vicky in The London Daily Mirror.

". . . and now, comrades, let us stand in silence for two minutes in memory of all those comrades who criticized Comrade Stalin while he was alive."

(This cartoon cannot be reprinted without permission of *The London Daily Mirror*.)

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I Shall Apologize No More . . .

Thr Krushchev speech reviewed on these pages has set off a volcanic response among world Communist leaders (see pages 7 and 8). But the most eloquent and revealing of all expressions of Communist reaction has come not from the embarrassed ranks of party officialdom, but from a fellow-traveler who has in the past been a vociferous apologist for Soviet communism and a tireless critic of Western democracy—the American author and Stalin Peace Prize winner Howard Fast. Unfettered by considerations of internal party politics, Mr. Fast could—and did—speak from the heart in his shock and disillusionment at the Khrushchev report. His moving statement probably epitomizes the distress and soul-searching now going on among rank and file Communists everywhere. Excerpts are reprinted from the New York Daily Worker, *June 12.*

There is little that one can say to take the deadly edge off the "secret" Khrushchev speech. . . . It is a strange and awful document, perhaps without parallel in history; and one must face the fact that it itemizes a record of barbarism and paranoic blood-lust that will be a lasting and shameful memory to civilized man.

I recognize that the public appearance of this document indicates that deep and important changes are taking place in Russia. . . . Yet . . . I, for one, looked hopefully but vainly at the end of the document for a pledge that the last execution had taken place on Soviet soil. I looked for a pledge of civil rights, for the sacred right of *habeus corpus*, of public appeal to higher courts. . . .

I looked for these things . . . knowing that they are sacred to the individual so long as injustice lingers anywhere. . . .

Instead, I learned that three more executions had been announced from the Soviet Union, and my stomach turned over with the blood-letting, with the madness of vengeance and counter-vengeance, of suspicion and counter-suspicion. I don't think I am alone in this feeling. I think millions of human beings share my disgust at this idiotic behavior—wicked, uncivilized, but above all, idiotic.

Where I failed miserably and where I swear by all that is holy that I will not fail again, was . . . [in failing] to see that . . . to abandon the holy right of man to his own conscience, his own dignity, his right to say what he pleases, to speak clearly and boldly for the truth as he sees the truth—and fearing no man, whether right or wrong—is no victory at all.

It is some small comfort to say that I did not know the facts in the Khrushchev report; but I cannot rest on that. I knew that the death penalty existed in the Soviet Union, and I knew in my own heart that capital punishment is an abomination and a disgrace to mankind. I knew there were prisons, and I believed that civilized society would make a short shrift of prisons, and yet I failed to charge the Soviet Union with this. I accepted the fact that Jewish culture had been wiped out in Russia; and I know that this is a fate no culture should ever meet; yet this too I did not challenge. I knew that Jews were forbidden to leave Russia for Israel, and yet I did not raise my voice to protest this restriction, even though I could make no sense or reason out of it. I knew that writers and artists and scientists were intimidated, but I accepted this as a necessity of socialism, even as I accepted all else that I have enumerated as a necessity of socialism.

This I can never accept again—and never again can I accept as a just practice under socialism that which I know to be unjust. . . . I must say that if Russia has in me a friend, it also has a severe and implacable critic. Never again will I remain silent when I can recognize injustice—regardless of how that injustice may be wrapped in the dirty linen of expediency or necessity. Never again will I fail to question, to demand proof. Never again will I accept the "clever" rationale, which appears to make sense but under scrutiny does not.

And with this said, I feel better—better than I have felt in a long time. There are many rewards in life, but I know of nothing better than for a man to feel whole and to say what he thinks bluntly. I think that, too, must be part of man's hope. . . .

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that the party cadres welcomed this opportunity to purge themselves of feelings of guilt, to find a more telling and significant scapegoat than Beria.)

There was no suggestion, in Mr. Khrushchev's opening speech at the Congress, of any crisis of authority. The forces making for change, embodied in the technical and administrative personnel of the country, received full recognition. But it must be assumed, *post facto*, that the air of confidence was in part fictitious, that the Communist leaders still felt the need to create fresh bonds between themselves and the members generally, to build relations of confidence and understanding between the rulers and the mass of the ruled. No better way could have been found—given the political narrowness of the regime—than to denounce the man who had destroyed all earlier bonds and made a virtue of mistrust.

In any case, once the conspiracy of silence was broken, it would have been difficult to stop at the point to which Mr. Mikoyan ventured. Whether a landslide has been set in motion by this drastic action it is too early to say. But the subterranean forces were already there, imprisoned within the petrified Stalinist mold. They would in any case have sought an outlet, and it is more likely that they can be kept under control and guided if the initiative in their release comes from above.

What cannot be in doubt is that the dual process of establishing a hierarchy within the leadership and of reaching a new social equilibrium will take time to work itself out. The Soviet rulers must hope that the revelations—or rather admissions—will prove no more than a nine days' wonder, that their own part in twenty years of tyranny and misrule will be overlooked in thankfulness that it has ended, and that they will be able to go ahead untrammelled by the discarded garments of their past.

It is difficult, unless one has lived in a totalitarian country, to understand the pressures to which its inhabitants are subjected. But what of the Communist leaders in the decadent democracies, over whom no secret police kept watch? They found no difficulty in approving the purge, and apparently as little in approving the rehabilitation of its victims. They were prepared to subscribe to the belief in Stalin's infallibility and now appear equally prepared to tread his reputation into the mud. Was none of them capable of distinguishing between theory and dogma, between dissent and treason? What of their historians, for whom the records were available, their scientists, technicians, writers, and artists, who were in a position to compare the Soviet output with that in other countries? It is not Stalin's writings, or genetics, or the quality of Madame Pankratova's history, or the technical standing of Western industry that have changed, but the party line.

This is not to suggest that the leaders of Communist parties in the West will have as little freedom in the future as they have had hitherto. On the contrary, it seems probable that they will have a far wider scope for initiative thrust on them. The Soviet leaders have emancipated themselves from the cramping obsession that there is only one pattern of revolution; it will now be up to the leaders of other parties to seek, under license, their own road.

Mr. Khrushchev dated Stalin's degeneration from the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, that is from 1934. The choice of date is significant, not because more than half the delegates who attended the congress—and 70 percent of the members of the Central Committee it elected—fell victims to the purge, but because it implies endorsement of the policy with which Stalin's name will always be associated, the policy of "revolution from above," of forced collectivization and industrialization—whose victims were probably no fewer than those of the great purge. To have denounced him wholly, as Beria is denounced, would have destroyed too much. To deny him altogether would be to deny the present leaders' own legitimacy and the very essence of the system they are operating. For if it would be foolish not to admit that Stalin's insanely suspicious and envious character, his megalomania, ignorance, and vanity account for some of the worst abuses of his rule, it is equally incontestable that a policy which imposed such burdens, pains and punishments could not have been applied except in a society where there are no alternative parties, alternative policies and alternative rulers. How, indeed, except in a totalitarian system, could Stalin have concentrated such power in his own hands?

This is the cardinal feature of the Soviet system which Mr. Khrushchev could not attack. And it is to preserve this that Stalin's crimes were said to have been committed from a mistaken view of the interests of the party and the masses. "In this lies the whole tragedy."

The more striking excrescences of the dictatorship, the paralyzing rigidity and conformity of Stalin's last years, can be condemned and abandoned now that the painful and costly stage of "primitive accumulation" is past. There is no risk that relaxation will start the whole system sliding backwards. (In the same way the forced labor camps have largely fulfilled their economic function and can be in part dissolved: the roads and railways and houses have been built, the mines

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have been mechanized. Inducements can now be combined with pressure in varying degrees to get labor to the uninviting wastes of the Arctic region.) Industry now has a broad enough basis and sufficient momentum to expand without subjecting the population to conditions which only brutal terrorism could persuade them to endure in silence. The endorsement of Stalin's earlier policies implies that criticism of the Communist Party, of its position in the country, and of its monopoly of power, will still not be tolerated.

The resignation of Molotov and Kaganovich from their ministerial posts (while remaining Deputy Premiers) continues the program of disavowing the past, leaving, of Stalin's old guard, only Mr. Mikoyan and the figurehead President, Marshal Voroshilov. The balance of power within the Presidium has shifted, and Mr. Malenkov now seems to hold a fairly isolated position. While the newly released forces find channels of expression and eventually settle down into a pattern that reflects the Soviet Union's changed position, internally and externally, the machinery of political power remains unchanged and the new elite appear to have full control of its operations. They are aware of the need for experiment and adoption, and are prepared to initiate it themselves. Stalin is said not to have visited the rural areas after 1928, whereas Mr. Khrushchev spends a good deal of his time traveling around his own as well as other countries.

The men who now rule were the beneficiaries of the policy they have discarded. They are operating a new policy. For the inhabitants of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc, the change is most welcome. The extent to which "controlled relaxation" may be permitted can perhaps be gauged from the way in which this policy has operated in Yugoslavia; there, nothing has been allowed to encroach on the unique position of the Communist Party, and the reduction in the size of maximum landholdings testifies to the belief that an independent peasantry is potentially an enemy of the Communist regime.

Externally, the change in policy antedates the Twentieth Congress. The rapprochement with Yugoslavia (the quarrel was singled out by Khrushchev as a particularly glaring example of "Stalin's shameful role" for which the Soviet Union "paid dearly") and the rapid development of friendly relations with the countries of Asia were all set in motion before the Congress. Broadly, Soviet foreign policy continues to aim at the neutralization of Europe, the isolation of America, and advance through the underdeveloped countries. But these aims are pursued with far greater flexibility and in more conventional terms than before; "during Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened." There is basically no difference between competitive coexistence and cold war, but the current term emphasizes that the struggle will be waged by other than military means. For its part, the USSR cannot begin to compete successfully until it approximates the level of productivity achieved in the United States, and to do this it requires, not the sullen acquiescence of an intimidated working class, but voluntary cooperation and the belief that initiative and independence will not have fatal consequences. The largest obstacle of all—the stagnation of agriculture—remains, and there is no sign that in this respect the essentials of Stalin's policy have been abandoned. Twenty-five years of collectivized agriculture have failed to attract the peasants, who, after all, represent nearly half the working population.

J. D.

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DISTRESS IN THE RANKS

As this issue of Problems of Communism *went to press, the cataclysmic impact of Khrushchev's revelations of Stalinist tyranny upon Communists the world over was revealing itself in unprecedented public statements from party leaders and sympathizers outside the Soviet orbit. In tones of protest which once would have been branded heresy, various CP leaderships have aired the questions inadequately answered or altogether avoided in Khrushchev's account. Basic among these: (1) How can the present-day leaders in Moscow (in view of their depiction of Stalin as a power-mad, fear-ridden tyrant responsible for the ills of a twenty-year despotic reign) defend their own inaction in permitting his continued leadership of Soviet and world communism? (2) More important, are there underlying defects in the Soviet system responsible for Stalin's assumption of unlimited personal power?*

Most outspoken among the Western Communist leaders was Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary-General of the Italian CP and a party theoretician of stature, whose 11,000-word declaration reflected profound disturbance and bewilderment among the Italian party rank-and-file (and was at the same time a Jack-be-nimble attempt to dodge the issue of his own accountability as an out-and-out Stalinist in years past). In tones more cautious, but with their own axes to grind, the French, British, American and other CP leaderships followed suit. Perhaps most surprising—and closest to the heart of the issues involved—was a statement from Pietro Nenni, head of the Italian Socialist Party and long a staunch alley of the Communists, who assailed the Khrushchev report as a totally inadequate explanation of Stalinism and called for the establishment of political liberty in the USSR and the "people's democracies." Excerpts from these statements appear below.

TOGLIATTI SPEAKS OUT . . .

On Communist Reaction: The criticism levelled at Stalin at the Twentieth Congress, most of which came unexpectedly, has certainly struck the Communist International framework, and also, in a lesser degree, its masses . . . it must be said that there has been not only surprise among them. There has been sorrow and sometimes bewilderment. Doubts have arisen about the past . . . These things were inevitable, owing to the seriousness of the facts denounced and the way it was done. . . .

On the Issue of Guilt: One is forced to admit that the errors that Stalin committed either were unknown by the great mass of the ruling cadres of the country and thus by the people, which does not seem likely, or that they were not considered errors . . . As you see, I exclude the explanation that a change was made impossible solely by the presence of military, police and terroristic apparatus which controlled the situation. . . .

The cause of all is supposed to lie in the "cult of personality," and in the cult of a person who . . . had a mania for greatness and an excessive self-love, was suspicious to the extreme . . . and was even subject to an evident form of persecution mania . . . We can only think among ourselves, that since he was such . . . [the present leaders] could at least have been more prudent in their public and solemn exaltation of the qualities of this man. . . .

Before, all the good was due to the superhuman positive qualities of one man; now all the evil is attributed to his equally exceptional and even shocking defects. Both in the one case and in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment that is proper to Marxism. The real problems are skipped over—how and why Soviet society could and did reach certain forms of departure from the democratic way and from the legality laid out for it, and even reached degeneration.

On the Ills of Soviet Society: It seems to us beyond doubt that Stalin's errors were linked with an excessive increase of the weight of bureaucratic apparatus in Soviet political and economic life, and perhaps above all in the life of the party. . . .

From this derived two principal consequences . . . The first was a sterilizing of the activity of the masses, in the places and organisms (party, trade unions, factory) and Soviet organisms where the new difficulties of the situation should have been confronted . . . The second consequence was still more serious . . . there developed little by little the tendency to consider that always and in every case the evil, the halt in the implementation of the plan, the difficulties in food supply . . . etc., etc., were due to sabotage, to the work of the class enemy, to groups of counterrevolutionaries working clandestinely, and so on

* * *

While I believe it absurd that the system be demolished for the sake of going back, I think that modifications must be brought about within it, even radical ones, on the basis of experience, on the basis of success attained in all fields, and on the actual basis of the need to have more effectual guarantees against such errors as Stalin's.

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For a "Marxist" Explanation: . . . It is up to the Soviet comrades to face some of the questions we have put and to supply the basis for a comprehensive reply . . . What is [important] today is to reply correctly with a Marxist criterion, to the question of how the errors today denounced got mixed up with the development of socialist society, and hence whether in the very development of this society there did not enter at a certain moment disturbing elements, errors of a general order, against which the whole camp of socialism must be put on guard . . .

—*Palmiro Togliatti, interview with a correspondent of* Nuovi Argomenti, *published in the Italian CP organ* Unita *on June 17, 1956.*

ECHOES AND NEW OUTCRIES . . .

The explanations thus far offered of the faults of Stalin, their origin, and the conditions in which they developed are unsatisfactory. A profound Marxist analysis is indispensable to determine the whole set of circumstances which made possible the exercise of Stalin's personal power.

It was erroneous, while Stalin was alive, to shower him with dithyrambic eulogies and to attribute to him exclusively the credit for all successes achieved in the Soviet Union thanks to a general line serving the construction of socialism. This attitude contributed toward developing the cult of personality and toward influencing the international workers' movement in the wrong direction. Today, it is unjust to attribute to Stalin alone everything negative that has happened in the activity of the CPSU.

—*Statement of the French CP Politburo, published in the party organ* L'Humanite, *June 19, 1956.*

We agree with the observations of Comrade Togliatti and the French Communist Party that it will be necessary to make a profound Marxist analysis of the causes of the degeneration in the functioning of Soviet democracy and party democracy; that it is not enough to attribute these developments solely to the character of one individual; and that a more adequate estimate of the role of Stalin both in its positive and negative aspects will be necessary.

—*Political Committee of the British CP, published in the London* Daily Worker, *June 22, 1956.*

In our opinion this speech should have been made public by the CPSU itself. We do not share the view that the questions dealt with, no matter how painful and abhorrent, are exclusively the internal affair of the CPSU. . . . A basic analysis of how such perversions of socialist democracy, justice and internationalism were permitted to develop and continue unchecked for twenty years must still be made. . . . Also required is a further and deeper examination of such questions as the structure and operation of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. . . .

—*Statement of the U. S. Communist Party, issued June 24, 1956.*

NENNI ADDS HIS VOICE . . .

In Blunter Complaints: It is evident that the massacres disclosed by Khrushchev involve responsibilities . . . of the whole directive apparatus. Terror, in conditions of time and place not justified by necessity, was the price paid to the suppression of all Democratic life inside the party and the state . . . [Yet] an attempt is not even made to answer the question: "How and why could these things come to pass?" . . . We do not even know how the Soviet ruling group has arrived at its conclusions, whether it is in agreement, or divided, and if so on what, and why.

A similar uncertainty manifests itself . . . as soon as the Rapporteur deals with the question of remedies. He points out three: (1) Condemn and uproot in the Bolshevist manner the "cult of personality" . . . (2) Continue systematically and effectively the work carried out by the Central Committee in the last few years. (3) Restore in full the Leninist principles of Socialist Soviet democracy . . . Fine declarations which, when Stalin was alive, were made a hundred times by Stalin and other Soviet leaders. The collective direction of the Politburo or of the Central Committee would certainly be preferable to the direction of one man, but . . . [it] is nevertheless no guarantee of democratic life. . . .

In Bolder Conclusions: The whole problem of Soviet society, the whole problem of the popular democracies that have followed in the footsteps of Soviet society, is reduced to the necessity for internal democratization, for the circulation of ideas, in a word for political liberty, a necessity which has lain below the surface of Soviet society for many years. It is substantially a question of . . . creating means and instruments for the formation of the free political initiative of the citizen, without there hanging over his head the accusation of being an enemy of the people, a deviationist, a saboteur . . . In this sense the Soviet crisis concerns not only the so-called errors of Stalin, but the Soviet system. . . .

—*Pietro Nenni in the Italian Socialist Party organs* Mondo Operaio *and* Avanti, *June 23 and 24, 1956.*

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Three Roads to Power

By RICHARD LOWENTHAL

THE Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party saw the first attempt since Lenin's time to systematize the experience of communism as an international movement. Never before have the Soviet leaders cast a theoretical eye on the Communist victories in China and Yugoslavia as well as on their own successes in Eastern Europe, viewing them as historical events from which new lessons can be learned by Communists everywhere. Never before have they told the Communist parties all over the world that there are other models to be followed than the Soviet.

In Western comment on the Congress, the importance of this new departure has tended to be overshadowed by the sensational reassessment of Stalin's role in Communist history and by the major changes in Soviet domestic politics connected with it. Yet the renewal of serious interest in the problems of "world revolution" is itself one of the major aspects of the breach with the Stalin tradition—an aspect which in the minds of Mr. Khrushchev and his team clearly forms a necessary complement to the diplomacy of "peaceful coexistence" and to the attempt to consolidate the CPSU's domestic position by a series of major reforms.

A Road Paved With Bad Intentions

THE one element in the reformulation of revolutionary theory which has so far aroused some discussion among non-Communists is the Soviet leaders' recognition that a "peaceful" or "parliamentary" road to "socialism" is possible under certain conditions. This has been widely interpreted as an attempt to trick Western Democratic Socialists and Asian nationalists into alliances of the "Popular Front" type. But while this interpretation is correct as far as it goes, most commentators seem to have missed the really new element in the theory. Namely, the earlier "Popular Fronts" of the 1930's were explicitly confined to the purpose of "defending democracy within the capitalist framework," *i.e.*, of creating governments friendly to the Soviet Union; this limitation was still implicit in Stalin's attempt to revive the popular front strategy in his 1952 speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress. Today, however, the "parliamentary road" is advocated as a means to achieve "socialism", *i.e.*, full Communist power.

It is true that Soviet spokesmen at the Twentieth Congress cited examples of past successful application of the strategy for this end. But they could find them only among countries where Soviet military pressure had played the decisive role in achieving this sort of "socialism" (as Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states)—the only condition in which Stalin had ever sanctioned the seizure of power. By contrast, at the Twentieth Congress the proximity and assistance of Soviet power were no longer mentioned as a condition for the future success of the "peaceful road"; in principle, attempts by the Communists to seize full control by this method are therefore henceforth permissible anywhere on the globe.

Because the revival of interest in world revolution has been widely overlooked, the importance of the dissolution of the Cominform has been equally underestimated. Observers have rightly recognized that this demolition of an outworn facade will not weaken the secret liaison machinery linking the Russian Communists with Communist parties in other countries. But there has been scarce comment on the reception given this demonstrative gesture by such gifted and ambitious leaders as Palmiro Togliatti in Italy, who see in it the green light for independent experiment in seeking the right road to power. It has also been overlooked that one of the effects of the move is to enable Soviet diplomacy to disclaim responsibility for such experiments more effectively. The years between the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and the formation of the Cominform in 1947 saw the greatest expansion of Communist power since the Russian Revolution; the period of the Cominform, for all its

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sharpening of conflict between East and West, saw in fact the freezing of the borderline of Communist rule in Europe.

Lenin's Great Error

WHEN Messrs. Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov and Shepilov reviewed the conditions of Communist victory at the Moscow Congress, they took a decisive step to free communism from a doctrinaire prejudice which had dogged its steps since the early days of the Comintern. For up to then, the only theoretically recognized model of the Communist seizure of power had been Lenin's October Revolution—a model that has never been successfully imitated in a period of almost 40 years.

Lenin and his contemporaries sincerely believed that their conquest of power had in its social essence been a working class revolution against the bourgeois state, and they tended to regard its most striking political features—the taking of local power by Soviets and the uprising of armed workers in the capital—as the necessary requisites for revolutionary success. The Soviets were organs for direct mass activity, analogous to the Paris Commune admired by Karl Marx. In the Bolshevik view only these organs could paralyze the bourgeois state machine and destroy it at its roots, while only an armed uprising could overthrow the bourgeois-democratic government and seize power. The example of the German revolution of 1918, though unsuccessful, confirmed this belief. For in Germany, too, workers' and soldiers' councils were formed (partly under the influence of Russian events), and in the following years a series of armed clashes took place between the Communist minority among the workers and counterrevolutionary military formations serving the "bourgeois republic." The Bolshevik leaders chose to view this development as proof of the typical character of their own experience.

Today it is clear that Lenin was totally mistaken both about the social and historical character of his own revolution and about the importance of its political forms. The revolution arose not from the oppression of the workers in a capitalist society, but from the failure of such a society to develop; the historical role of the revolution was not to end exploitation but to modernize an underdeveloped country by dictatorial methods. The Soviets were not typical organs of working class rule, but unique—and very temporary—forms of mass organization in a country where, owing to Tsarist oppression, the tradition of stable democratic organizations was lacking. This is why they never achieved comparable importance in Germany and never were formed in other advanced countries. The uprising in the Russian capital, finally, was victorious only because of the absence of a tradition of "bourgeois democracy"; in no country with established parliamentary institutions did the workers show the expected tendency to rise "against the state."

The really decisive political feature of the October Revolution was neither the role of the Soviets nor that of the workers' uprising in Petrograd, but the seizure of power by the centralized Bolshevik Party; it was this that made Lenin's victory the first of the totalitarian revolutions of the twentieth century. By contrast, the Soviets and the workers' uprising merely arose from the fact that this revolution was grafted onto the earlier, uncompleted democratic revolution against Tsarism, the last of the great democratic revolutions of European history. Lenin, who for all his insistence on the role of the party was unaware of the true implications of the instrument of power he had forged, saw himself as the heir of the democratic revolutionary tradition of the West; hence his belief that the role of the Soviets, or of Soviet-like organs, and the workers' uprising would be repeated in the industrially advanced "bourgeois democracies."

First Concepts of the "Peaceful" Path

IN that belief, the Communist parties of the West marched for 15 years from defeat to defeat. In countries with large organized labor movements, slogans like "Bildet Arbeiterraete!" or "Les Soviets partout!" proved absurd even in times of revolutionary crisis; and even where millions of workers voted Communist, as in Germany during the great depression of 1929–32 or in France in the 1930's, they did not show the slightest inclination to rise against the "bourgeois-democratic state". Towards the end of the postwar crisis, Karl Radek became the first Bolshevik leader to perceive the error; on the basis of the experience in Germany, he persuaded the Comintern in 1922 to adopt a demand for "workers' governments" as a "transitional slogan"—in other words to call on the workers to press for parliamentary governments of the "united front," which were then to be urged on to extra-constitutional measures, until the resistance of the old ruling classes and their bureaucracies would convince the workers of the need to establish proletarian dictatorships. In a sense, Radek may thus claim to be the originator of the present concept of the "parliamentary road to socialism"; but after the defeat of the German Communists in 1923, his

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ideas were condemned as "opportunist" and the old doctrine restored in its full rigidity.

Yet under Stalin the restoration of the old doctrine did not imply a return to the old illusions about a working class revolution in the West; on the contrary, it was a form of writing off the prospects of such a revolution, of turning the Comintern into a mere auxiliary of the Soviet state while proceeding with the "building of socialism in one country."

But as Stalin, empirically following the logic of power, became gradually conscious of the true implications of the type of party which Lenin had led to victory, he was bound to see also the possibilities for foreign Communist parties in a new light. At home, he proceeded to resolve the contradiction between the democratic-revolutionary heritage in Lenin's ideas and the realistic needs of a totalitarian state by liquidating the former and rationalizing the latter; abroad, he began to explore the possibilities of using dependent totalitarian parties as instruments not of popular revolution but of the infiltration of foreign governments, with the aim of influencing their international policy in the interest of the Soviet Union. The first large-scale experiment of this type was the policy imposed on the Chinese Communists from 1924–1927, which led to their affiliation with the Kuomintang, their filling of many key posts in its military-political machine during the northward offensive, and finally to an attempt by the CCP leadership to put the brake on the peasant revolution in a vain effort to avoid conflict with Chiang Kai-shek. The fact that this policy ultimately failed must not be allowed to obscure its historical importance in pioneering a completely new type of Communist activity.

The experiment in China was facilitated by Communist acceptance of the doctrine that in the national revolution of such a backward, "semi-colonial" country the immediate aim of the Communists could not be the "dictatorship of the proletariat" but only an alliance with all "progressive" classes; the strategy of infiltration was justified as the political form of that alliance. It took the victory and consolidation of Nazism in Germany, however, to make Stalin agree to a modified application of this strategy in democratic, industrial countries.

Pages From the Fascist Book

MUSSOLINI had been the first to see that the technique of the centralized party and the one-party state could be applied for gaining and preserving power without accepting the Bolshevik ideology or program. He also recognized that such a party was by its very nature independent of any particular "class basis"—that it could afford to rely on different social strata in turn. Applying these observations, he demonstrated how such a party could exploit the institutions of a parliamentary democracy in order to seize power "legally." This lesson was not understood in Russia at the time, but it was carefully applied by Hitler. By the summer of 1934, when Hitler had proved by the Roehm purge of June 30 that he was not the stooge of the Reichswehr which Stalin had believed him to be, the latter began to take him seriously both as a danger to the USSR and as a model for new and significant political techniques. The time had come for Bolshevism to return the compliment of imitation.

In the meantime, the Communist parties in the West, while losing much of their early strength, had gone through many Kremlin-imposed changes of leadership. Admiration for the power and ruthlessness of Stalinist Russia rather than belief in a repetition of Lenin's revolution had become the decisive article of faith. Stalin now decided to use the CP's to try and bring about "anti-Fascist" governmental coalitions; for the first time in their history, they were to attempt seriously to influence parliamentary politics within the bourgeois state, using the unscrupulous maneuverability of a totalitarian party to this end. But as in China ten years earlier, the aim was not to seize power and carry out a social revolution but to influence foreign policy in alliance with all "progressive" classes. This time, the reason given for limiting the objective was not the backwardness of the countries concerned, but the need to avoid civil war with Hitler on the doorstep, and the professed danger to the Soviet Union if the Western countries without strong Communist parties—particularly Britain and the United States—should be scared into Hitler's camp by the spectre of Communist revolution.

Here was the essence of the "Popular Front" strategy: it was the first great experiment in using totalitarian Communist parties to gain influence within the state machine of Western democracies by parliamentary means. Since the objectives were limited to foreign policy, the CP's were ordered to modify their social and economic programs to keep them within the "capitalist framework." The strategy was thus an attempt to combine the lessons of the Chinese experiment and of Hitler's victory in a spirit completely foreign to the Leninist tradition. Again, it failed in

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the end. But in France it resulted in large permanent gains by the Communist Party; and in Spain it led, during the civil war, to almost complete Communist control of the remnant of the Republican state machine when the latter became dependent on Soviet supplies and advisers. From this experience, Stalin learned how successful the new technique of "legal" seizure of the state machine might be, if combined with dependence on the Soviet Union.

Wartime and Postwar Fronts

THE new strategy was abandoned between the time of the Munich agreement and the German attack on the USSR—*i. e.*, the period of Soviet-German negotiations leading to the Stalin-Hitler pact. But after Hitler's invasion, the same policy was readopted under the slogan of "National Liberation Fronts" in occupied Europe and of "National Unity" elsewhere. The Soviet directive to all Communists during this phase was to build up their organizations, and to occupy key posts but to be extremely moderate in their programs so as not to frighten the Western powers. In the process of liberation, Communists everywhere were instructed to join coalition governments on the broadest possible basis, not even rejecting at first the leadership of turncoat generals in ex-Axis countries. But it quickly became obvious that Stalin intended to make completely different use of these coalitions, according to whether the countries concerned were in his own military sphere or in that of the Western powers.

In Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, the Communists were for the first time encouraged to follow the "parliamentary road to socialism" to the bitter end—that is, to imitate Fascist methods of dealing with their coalition partners once they had control of the physical means of power and the machinery of official propaganda. The individual Communist parties were given considerable latitude in the timing and tactics they adopted to eliminate, split or swallow rival parties, to enforce single-list elections, and to carry out "economic revolutions from above." But everywhere the result of "people's democracy" was the same within a few years—the imposition of absolute Communist Party rule as an extension of direct Soviet control.

In Western Europe, on the other hand, the Communists were warned strictly against any measures which might bring them into conflict with the Western allies for as long as Allied troops remained in their respective countries. (There were also repeated warnings of this kind in the borderline case of Yugoslavia, but they were disobeyed by the Yugoslav Communist leaders.) After that, the Russian attitude seems to have been ambiguous for some time; the indications are that Stalin never wished any Communists to make a bid for total power, either by parliamentary or violent means, in countries where they could not be physically backed by Soviet forces and kept afterwards dependent on "the leading role of the Soviet Union," but that he was prevailed upon to tolerate a certain amount of experiment. It is a fact, at any rate, that a number of Western Communist leaders in 1946 made statements interpreting the coalition governments of this time as stages in a "people's democratic" development, which might peacefully lead to "socialism" by the "parliamentary road". And the Italian Communists, at least, showed considerable confidence that they might come to power as independently on this road as Tito had done on the road of civil war. It was only after the end of the Communist participation in West European governments, the formation of the Cominform, and finally the conflict with Tito, that these hopes faded and the Western Communists returned—after some ill-prepared attempts at revolutionary mass action—to sterile and rigid opposition.

Today, after the Twentieth CPSU Congress and the dissolution of the Cominform, the West European Communists are resurrecting these statements of 1946, and again it is the Italians who do so with the greatest self-confidence and apparent conviction. The "Leninist revival" has resulted in the first explicit theoretical recognition of the strategy of the "parliamentary road" which had been developed, gropingly and gradually over more than twenty years, by Stalin; but it has also freed that strategy from its Stalinist limitation to either foreign policy objectives or to states under Soviet military control. In contrast to Lenin, the present leaders know as clearly as did Stalin that they are dealing not with working class risings against the bourgeois state, but with totalitarian techniques for legally seizing the state machine; in contrast to Stalin, they believe in the "world revolution"—*i.e.*, in the possibility and desirability of Communist victories outside the immediate Soviet sphere.

Mao's Path to Power

THE possibility of such victories must have been impressed even on a reluctant Stalin by two Communist movements which followed an altogether different road from either Lenin's or his own. These were, of course, the Chinese and Yugoslav experiences.

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Mao Tse-tung had from the beginning been opposed to one aspect of Stalin's Chinese policy of the 1920's—the attempt to brake the peasant revolution in the interest of preserving the Communist-Kuomintang alliance. After the defeat of this policy, some of the military specialists of the Chinese CP, including Chou En-lai, undertook a number of unsuccessful attempts to imitate the Leninist tactics of the armed workers' uprising, even though conditions were plainly unfavorable. Meanwhile Mao, then still far from the leadership of the party, took to partisan warfare in a mountainous region.

It seems evident that Mao at first acted not from a conscious strategic concept of the Chinese road to power but from an instinct of political self-preservation, guided by the immemorial tradition of Chinese peasant risings. Only gradually, as this partisan warfare was moderately successful while all else failed, did Mao's strategic concept develop. Some Western students of communism have seen his originality in the bold decision to rely on guerilla tactics in the countryside and to avoid decisive battles for the control of big towns, even though this meant building up an army and a party organization in which the peasants formed the great majority, contrary to Communist doctrine. Yet the difference between Mao's partisan warfare and the traditional peasant rising was no less vital: it consisted in his gradual creation of a *mobile* force, composed in part of intellectuals and working class cadres but mainly of *uprooted* peasants, who could be used outside their region of origin. The famous "long march" to the Northwest, like the equally heroic marches of Tito's partisans during the war, was the visible symbol of the complete emancipation of the new army from its original social basis; despite the peasant origin of most of its members, it was no more a class force of peasants than a class force of workers, but a truly totalitarian creation.

The success of Mao's policy depended in part on the creation of new local government organs—which acted also as organs of agrarian revolution—in whatever area was held at any time by the partisan forces. The "Soviets" arose in China as did later analogous organs in Yugoslavia not as spontaneous forms of mass organization but as auxiliary institutions of military rule imposed by the party. Another condition of success was the transfer of experienced Communist cadres from the cities to the "Soviet areas". The party leadership long refused to take this step, however, since it would have implied recognition that the uprising in the countryside had, contrary to traditional doctrine, become the party's main task; only after Mao had struggled for years against the "working class" prejudices of successive Moscow-imposed leaderships were such transfers effected. After the recent Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, Mao at last openly attributed such "sectarian" resistance to the errors of Stalin.

In Yugoslavia, Tito based his partisan activity from the start on a study of the Chinese experience, transferring the Central Committee and the largest possible number of urban cadres to the mountains and using the latter as soon as possible to form "proletarian brigades" in order to achieve mobility. Years later, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the Yugoslav leader who had been in charge of liaison with Communist partisans in neighboring countries, saw one of the principal causes of the defeat of the Greek Communists in their repeated hesitation to take similar steps.

Limits of the Partisan Warfare Strategy

WHILE Mao's partisan maneuvers succeeded in preserving the Communist force for years as a potential contender for power and an actual factor of anarchy, his tactics would not have led to victory without the Japanese war and occupation; the latter acted as a decisive solvent of all state authority and at the same time gave the Communists an opportunity to add the appeal of nationalism to their program. The German occupation played an even more important role in Yugoslavia, for without it no partisan war would have started. Similarly, Japanese occupation and anti-colonial revolt offered the Vietnamese Communists their opportunity. By contrast, Communist attempts to apply "Chinese tactics" of guerilla uprisings in independent Asian countries since 1948 have been as uniformly unsuccessful as the attempts to apply "Russian tactics" in Europe after World War I.

During both the Sino-Japanese war and World War II the importance of "National Front" tactics was fully recognized by Stalin, and he urged on all Communist partisan forces a corresponding moderation of their program—in the Chinese case successfully, in the Yugoslav case with very limited and temporary success only. But the final struggle for power was initiated in both cases against his advice. It is doubtful whether the later guerilla actions elsewhere were ever intended by Moscow to be more than harassing operations.

It is only now that partisan warfare of the Chinese and Yugoslav type has been recognized in Moscow as a particular road to power which other Communist

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parties may use as a model in similar circumstances.

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The Soviet leaders made no attempt at the Twentieth Congress to map out in detail the several "roads to power" they now profess to sanction for foreign Communists, or even to lay down a complete list of them—except in the purely formal sense that any future conquest of power could be described as either "legal" or "violent." This confinement to broad generalities was deliberate; in fact, leading Soviet spokesmen emphasized that it would be absurd to expect a revolution to take only one or a few prescribed forms in all countries and conditions. In short, the new line is aimed precisely at emancipating world communism from any hampering doctrines about the form of revolution; the Soviet leaders have at last come forth with the stark recognition that it is the achievement of power alone which matters.

Such power is still described in Leninist terms as "the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of its Communist vanguard." But the sanction both of the Fascist-Stalinist technique of the "legal" *coup d'état* and of the Maoist-Titoist strategy of partisan warfare suggests full consciousness on the part of the Soviet leaders that the alleged proletarian class content of the dictatorship is a fiction, that its totalitarian form as a dictatorship of the Communist Party is the only relevant reality. Ironically enough, they seem to have gained this theoretical insight into the essence of their own system at an historical moment when the growth of new social forces with the achievement of industrialization makes the continued preservation of party dictatorship increasingly difficult even in the Soviet Union itself.

Bulganin and Khrushchev in Britain

By DENIS HEALEY

IT was under the heady influence of the "Geneva spirit" in July 1955 that Prime Minister Anthony Eden first invited the Soviet leaders, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, to visit Britain. However, in the nine months that elapsed before the actual visit, Soviet actions gave the Prime Minister more than one occasion for wondering if his invitation had not been somewhat over-impulsive.

In September the arms deal between satellite Czechoslovakia and Egypt confronted British policy in the Middle East with a new and exceptionally dangerous challenge. Two months later the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva showed that Soviet policy on specific issues was as unyielding as ever. Then, as winter approached, the Asian tour of Bulganin and Khrushchev gave clear warning of the part which such foreign visits were calculated to play in the Soviet game of psychological warfare, while the public criticisms of Britain's colonial past voiced by the Soviet leaders during their tour were particularly offensive to Prime Minister Eden's own Conservative Party.

Conservative spokesmen both in Parliament and in the press began suggesting that the invitation should be withdrawn, and the Prime Minister's replies on the subject showed that his own enthusiasm for the visit had dwindled. Official misgivings reached their climax during the unexpected three weeks' sojourn in Britain of Soviet Deputy Premier Georgi Malenkov.

Malenkov Paves the Way

MALENKOV'S coming grew out of a routine invitation which the nationalized British Electricity Authority had extended to its Soviet counterpart to send a delegation to tour British power plants. When the delegation arrived in March, the British were astounded to find it led by the redoubtable Deputy Premier, who also wears the cap of Minister

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for Electricity and Power Stations. His behavior during his stay turned the visit into a considerable Soviet propaganda success.

Malenkov mingled freely with the British people both at work and at play, performing all the rituals expected of a professional politician in an Anglo-Saxon democracy—kissing babies, patting children's heads, and distributing appropriate flatteries to all he met. The contrast between his conduct and the popular Stalin-inspired stereotype of how a Communist boss behaves had a considerable impact on British opinion.

Those who met Malenkov for private talks were no less impressed by his obviously quick intelligence and subtlety. At the long press conference held at the end of his visit, he answered or parried all questions with wit, moderation and adroitness. For example, when asked his opinion of British women, he replied with a twinkle that it was rather difficult to make love through an interpreter!

The Soviet intention to make propaganda capital of the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit became ever clearer as the big moment approached. When the British press directed a barrage of criticism at General Ivan Serov, the ill-reputed head of the MVD, who flew to London during Malenkov's stay in order to make security preparations for the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit, the Kremlin responded by discreetly dropping Serov from the delegation. After Malenkov's return, the Soviet Government ingenuously showed its hand in another manner, by publishing an official protest against alleged British refusal to allow Bulganin and Khrushchev more time for direct contact with the British people—a complaint which was repeated even after their visit. Meanwhile, inside the Soviet Union, the press, radio and television launched an unprecedented propaganda campaign friendly to present-day Britain. Naturally, no hint was permitted of British opposition to the visit, which by this time was quite considerable.

Thus it was abundantly clear, when the Soviet leaders stepped ashore from the cruiser *Ordzhonikidze* at Portsmouth on April 18, that their purpose in coming was vastly different from the purpose which had inspired Prime Minister Eden's invitation. The Kremlin obviously saw the visit as part of its grand softening-up campaign launched at the July 1955 "summit" meeting in Geneva, an operation directed primarily at public opinion not only in Britain but throughout the world, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Soviet leaders wanted to create an atmosphere of relaxation which would induce the peoples of the non-Communist countries to exert pressure on their governments in favor of a wholesale change in attitude toward the USSR. They also wanted to convince their own people, or such segments of the Soviet public as exert any influence on government, that the new line would promote Soviet interests far more effectively than the old.

The British Government, on the other hand, had hoped originally that the visit might further realization of the substantive goals sketched out at the "summit" parley. Now this hope had all but vanished, and the government was painfully aware of the propaganda aims which the Kremlin meant to pursue. Under the circumstances, the only course was to try to salvage something from the visit by drawing the Soviet leaders into protracted informal negotiations on the main issues of the cold war.

Propaganda Failure

IN the end, neither side achieved much of what it intended. Bulganin and Khrushchev, for various reasons, made far less impact on British public opinion than had Malenkov. Their busy schedule allowed them few opportunities for direct contact with the people, and the extensive security precautions which marked their public appearances had a rather repugnant effect. In particular, their escort of uniformed, helmeted and goggled motorcyclists moving with mechanical precision and at high speed called to mind all too vividly Orwell's stark picture of 1984.

Compared with the jovial, engaging Malenkov, Khrushchev came nearer resembling, at a distance, the brutal Bolshevik of popular imagination, although in close-up his face is not devoid of sensitivity and humor. Malenkov, also, had benefited from the traditional British sympathy for the underdog because of his relegation to a back seat in the Soviet collective leadership; and perhaps the spontaneous warmth of his reception produced of itself a reaction toward a more cautious and reserved welcome for the star players who followed him on the scene.

In any case the sparse crowds which lined the routes traversed by Bulganin and Khrushchev rarely evinced more feeling than a wary curiosity, the occasional scattered cheers invariably matched by boos. Only at Oxford did the visitors receive a really noisy reception, and it could scarcely have gratified them once its nature had been explained to them by their interpreters. Thousands of boisterous undergraduates chanted "Poor Old Joe" and the "Volga Boat Song". Some carried banners with such inscriptions as "Stalin for Prof" and "Big Brother is watching you"; and at one point a firecracker exploded within a few feet of the distinguished guests, much to the consternation of their bodyguards.

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Indeed, the uproarious proceedings at Oxford illustrated what was a very general popular reaction—neither extreme friendliness nor bitter hostility, but a kind of humorous curiosity with an undertone of malice born of irrepressible British antipathy for everything totalitarian. Thus, the two leaders were quite commonly referred to as "Bulge and Krush," and in truth the pair, inseparable yet so strongly contrasting with each other, could not but invite such analogies from the music-hall.

Though less successful than Malenkov in appealing to the public, Khrushchev on occasion showed an extraordinary flair for judging his audience. His first statement, made at a Soviet Embassy luncheon on the second day of the visit, had an excellent press. His speech the following evening at the Royal Naval College was calculated to appeal very directly to the senior officers assembled there. Most of all, his final press conference was a big success, and those who watched it on television—not too many since the telecast was at 9:30 in the morning—were impressed. Khrushchev obviously had some difficulty in curbing his volubility on this occasion, but what he said was witty, relaxed and straightforward—even in evasion.

His other performances were definitely less successful. The bullying tone of his speech at Birmingham, in which he boasted of the USSR's atomic striking power, was universally resented by the British public. And his behavior at the celebrated Labor Party dinner—of which more later—completely wiped out whatever good will he may have won in his more restrained appearances.

Diplomatic Balance Sheet

IF the visit failed to satisfy all the Soviet propaganda aims, the British Government likewise gained little of positive value from the negotiations that took place. On all the chronic sore points of the cold war, the Soviet leaders remained absolutely rigid. Their one minor concession—made at Communist China's expense—was an agreement not to press for the holding of all-Vietnam elections by the originally scheduled date of July 1956.

On the Middle East, they entered into a horse-trade with Britain, the ultimate significance of which has yet to be explored. In return for Britain's tacitly pigeonholing the 1950 Tripartite Declaration which gives a Western guarantee against forcible changes in the Israel-Arab status quo, Khrushchev and Bulganin gave a commitment to cooperate in seeking a settlement of the Palestine dispute through the United Nations. In the short run this may cost the USSR some Arab good will, but the Kremlin undoubtedly considers a temporary setback in Egypt a cheap price to pay for admission to the Great Power concert on the Middle East, which reinforces the Soviet bargaining position in the area as a whole.

On trade also the value of the Anglo-Soviet conversations is uncertain. Khrushchev handed Prime Minister Eden a shopping list which would increase British exports to the USSR fivefold in five years if present strategic restrictions were removed and if the Soviet Union were able to earn enough sterling to foot the bill. Only long technical discussions will show whether Moscow is prepared at least to start by purchasing the non-strategic items on the list, and whether the necessary financing can be arranged.

The joint communique issued at the end of the talks was even more vague in regard to cultural cooperation. This reflected the Soviet leaders' great reluctance during the talks to accept the basic British condition that exchange visits should be transferred out of the bailiwick of Communist front organizations into non-political channels.

Summing up what had been accomplished in the diplomatic sphere, Prime Minister Eden claimed that the exchanges with Khrushchev and Bulganin constituted at least "the beginning of a beginning" toward improved relations. Certainly they were no more. But the visit did produce one important result which was totally unexpected by all concerned. It arose out of the Soviet leaders' contact not with the Government but with Her Majesty's Opposition, the British Labor Party.

Khrushchev Dynamites the Popular Front

IN view of the line laid down at the 20th CPSU Congress in Moscow directing Communists all over the world to bury the hatchet and cooperate with the Socialists, it was fully anticipated that Khrushchev and Bulganin would make special efforts to curry favor with the Labor Party during their stay in Britain. They had their first real opportunity to do so on April 23, five days after their arrival, when the entire Soviet delegation dined in the House of Commons with the Labor Party's National Executive Committee and "Shadow Cabinet."

The dinner got under way in a friendly atmosphere. It was preluded by a certain amount of good-humored but somewhat pointed banter on both sides, in which George Brown, a young trade union MP, figured prominently. After the meal there was an exchange of formal compliments, Premier Bulganin expressing regret that diplomatic protocol had stood in the way of more abundant contacts with the Labor Party. Then Khrushchev was pressed to say a few words.

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He rose and made an impromptu speech which, with translation, lasted for more than an hour, growing more and more offensive by the minute.

To the Labor leaders, who a few weeks earlier had heard Malenkov deliver a tellingly restrained speech in the same room, Khrushchev's diatribe was as surprising as it was insulting. Several of them described it afterward as pure Stalinism. The speech notably included a threat to confront Britain with a new equivalent of the Stalin-Hitler Pact and a blunt rejection of any sort of arms inspection affecting any part of Soviet-controlled territory, including the Central European satellites.

In the stunned silence which followed Khrushchev's outburst, Hugh Gaitskell, the new leader of the Labor Party, rose to bring the meeting to a close. After voicing some general courtesies, he said that he could not let the occasion pass without raising the question of the Socialists imprisoned in the Communist-ruled East European countries and in the Soviet Union for no other crime than holding the same views as the British Labor Party. He also asked for information concerning the status of Jews in the USSR.

Khrushchev replied in extremely insulting fashion, declaring that Gaitskell would have to look elsewhere for "agents who would protect the enemies of the working class." He refused to accept Gaitskell's proffered list of 150 imprisoned Socialists on the grounds that there were no Socialists in the Soviet Union, and that he could accept no responsibility for the actions of the satellite governments. At this point Aneurin Bevan got into the argument with a heated defense of social democracy. The Soviet leaders finally beat a retreat long after they had intended, leaving the new Popular Front program in virtual ruins behind them.

It is not easy to account for Khrushchev's behavior unless the explanation was simply that he was excessively tired and irritable. Ever since the incident, the Soviet leadership has manifested an extraordinary degree of sensitivity about what happened. Khrushchev and Bulganin sought immediately to throw the blame on Gaitskell and Bevan, telling the world that they would much rather deal with Conservatives than with Socialists. Both *Pravda* and *Izvestia* returned to the topic repeatedly in the following month.

When the two leaders returned to Moscow on April 28, Bulganin—who had sat silent and embarrassed throughout Khrushchev's tirade at the dinner—declared that "the only organization which tried, by its conduct, to spoil the atmosphere of our visit was the Labor Party, its Executive Committee and its leaders." *Pravda* later likened Gaitskell to Ramsay Macdonald, who—said the paper—"decided to betray his party," and it further alleged that Gaitskell had become the party's leader against the wishes of the rank and file.

Aftermath and Interpretation

NONETHELESS, there is reason to believe that the Labor Party's informal intervention, despite—or perhaps because of—the hullabaloo it raised, did have some effect toward hastening the release of imprisoned Socialists in the East European satellites. Since the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit, the satellite governments have, one by one, been announcing the liberation of Socialists whose names were on the Labor Party's list. Several Rumanian Socialists, formerly members of parliament, have reappeared in their home towns, and a number of Hungarian Socialists on the Labor Party list are now also believed to be free.

Despite these conciliatory efforts to undo the damage done by Khrushchev's intemperate rejection of the Labor Party plea, it is doubtful that the worldwide Communist campaign to win Socialist cooperation can recover completely from the blow. Khrushchev virtually reduced the campaign to so much nonsense and, in so doing, smothered his own baby.

Inside Britain, the affair had a curious consequence in turning the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit into a partisan political issue. The controversy was marked by some complex twists, with some Conservatives charging that a Gaitskell-headed Laborite government would destroy all hope of friendly relations with Soviet Russia, and with malcontents inside the Labor Party attempting to exploit the dinner incident against Gaitskell himself or against George Brown, who is Bevan's main rival for the post of party treasurer.

Foreign observers might be excused for imagining that prominent figures in both the government and opposition parties believe it is not popular in Britain to stand up to the Soviet Union. This may well explain the seeming conviction of the Soviet leaders that public opinion in Britain is predominantly favorable toward the USSR and that mistrust of the Soviet Union is confined to unrepresentative cliques.

It remains to comment on some broader aspects of the visit. Although the Soviet leaders did not succeed in their primary goal of propagandizing the British public, they have definitely been trying to exploit the propaganda value of the visit in other countries. In Italy, for example, Communist posters displayed during the recent local elections carried a photograph of Eden and Bulganin signing the joint

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THE AMBASSADORS

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communique issued at the end of the Soviet visit, the inscription on the posters reading, "Bulganin and Eden are concluding peace. If you want to relax tension, vote Communist!" Similar propaganda may carry some weight in France and West Germany, not to speak of Asia. It was certainly a tip-off of Soviet intentions that two hundred cameramen were brought along to cover the Khrushchev-Bulganin tour, and one can be sure that skillful editing will make up for any deficiencies in the raw material.

It also seems probable that the itinerant activities of Khrushchev and Bulganin are calculated to play a part in consolidating their position at home as *primi inter pares* in the new collective leadership. The Soviet press and radio, in their gross exaggeration of the warmth of the British welcome as in their belittling treatment of the Labor Party dinner, appeared extremely anxious to protect the reputation of the new leaders as beloved of all mankind, except a few anti-Soviet fanatics. In this context, it will be interesting to see whether the contrast between Malenkov's success in Britain and Khrushchev's failure does not produce new strains in the leadership rather than bolster the present status quo.

Khrushchev himself, at a recent Kremlin reception, remarked, "When we were in Britain, the Labor Party leaders praised Bulganin a great deal but were unpleasant to me. I am for the Conservatives."

The most difficult thing to assess is the impact of the visit on the thinking of the Soviet leaders themselves. Direct contact with political leaders of the Western democratic world in their natural habitat can scarcely fail to make a deep impression upon men who have been isolated from the outside world for a generation. There were significant shifts in Soviet Asian policy after the earlier Khrushchev-Bulganin tour of India and Burma—shifts which indicated that the Soviet leaders had really learned something from the attitudes of the people they met.

While there have yet to be indications of a similarly profitable lesson learned in Britain, it seems reasonable to expect, in general, that foreign travel by top Soviet leaders will tend to lessen some of the doctrinal rigidities of Soviet diplomatic policy. However, the crucial question—which remains wholly in the field of speculation—is whether such changes will produce a genuine friend or merely a more cunning enemy.

Lessons for the West

ON the other hand, the West, too, can learn something from direct contacts with the Soviet leaders. Skillful negotiation, even if it fails to produce agreement, can often cast light into hitherto obscure corners of Soviet policy and reveal unsuspected complexities within the Soviet leadership. What the British leaders learned from their meetings with Bulganin and Khrushchev is unknown since the conversations were confidential. Still, some general observations can be made without inside knowledge.

Above all, the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit confirmed the impression given by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February that the present Soviet collective leadership, whatever may be its internal differences of policy and personality, is united by an expanding confidence in the ultimate triumph of the Communist system all over the world. If the men in the Kremlin are frightened of anything, their fear would seem to be more of one another than of the defeat of communism in the world ideological struggle.

The Soviet leaders' statements and posture in Britain also lent weight to the conclusion that their confidence is not just bluff, but grounded in hard facts which no Western government can safely ignore. Khrushchev's repeated and gratuitous emphasis on Soviet atomic striking power was indicative of the Kremlin's belief that this power is already great enough to give vastly increased strength to Soviet diplomacy. As for total economic output, it will be a long time before that of the Communist bloc can match the West's, but it is already evident from the Soviet economic offensive in Asia and elsewhere that the Kremlin intends and is able to allot substantial resources to the furtherance of Soviet diplomatic-strategic objectives. Finally, Khrushchev's boastful arrogance seemed to reflect Soviet confidence in the effective unity of the world Communist bloc.

It seems likely that the Soviet leaders will seek further invitations for foreign travel. If so, their undoubted purpose as in the case of the British visit and the earlier Asian tour, will be to appeal to public opinion over the heads of the host governments. Britain's recent experience would seem to point to the wisdom, on the part of any future prospective host, of settling and publishing in advance the matters on which agreement will be sought, so that domestic public opinion may have a touchstone by which to judge the real value of the new Soviet spirit.

If the West can contrive a means whereby touring Soviet leaders, instead of being allowed to pose as all things to all men, can be obliged to take a clearcut stand on specific issues of critical importance to East-West understanding, then—and only then—will the West have nothing to fear and possibly a great deal to gain by agreeing to future visits.

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Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Policy

By JERZY GLIKSMAN

THE downgrading of Stalin and the new Soviet tactics in foreign affairs have overshadowed by their dramatic impact a number of less spectacular but important changes in the Soviet internal scene. Of these, the reforms in the field of labor law are undoubtedly among the most significant. An analysis of recent developments in Soviet labor policies, which culminated in the decree of April 25, 1956,[1] moderating labor discipline regulations, may serve to reveal the scope and significance of the changes. It is obvious that Soviet labor policy is geared primarily to the basic problem of the Soviet economy—the level of labor productivity. The major speeches delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 1956) indicate clearly that the problem of obtaining higher labor productivity is a source of increasing concern to the Soviet rulers.

There is good cause for alarm. Soviet statistics show that the rate of increase in labor productivity has been declining; in fact, the industrial goals of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–1955) were reached only because the labor force was enlarged beyond planned figures. In spite of the recently announced reduction in the size of the armed forces, an increase in manpower at the previous rate cannot be expected during the current Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956–1960); the low birth rate during World War II, the slow-down in rural recruitment of labor, and the planned longer schooling of youth are among the reasons. Thus, if the contemplated introduction of a 40-hour work week is to become a reality without causing a decrease in production, it is imperative that output per man-hour be increased. It is only in this context that the recent decree can be understood properly.

For the Soviet effort to increase labor productivity has been a continuous process of trial and error, in which the components of incentives, indoctrination, and coercion have been differently emphasized at various periods. Although no single method has proved sufficient, material incentives have been stressed above all other devices. The use of ideological and social incentives, of prestige symbols; the manipulation of "socialist emulation" drives, and the organization of campaigns to humiliate "slackers" have also played a considerable role. All these methods or devices have been bolstered by the enforcement of so-called work norms; by administrative controls exercised by the government, party, and trade unions; and, finally, by labor discipline laws.

From the beginning of accelerated industrialization in the late 1920's until the late 1940's Soviet labor legislation continuously increased the degree of compulsion and pressure on the working class. Since 1950–51, however, the situation has been changing. The authorities apparently recognized that some of the most repressive features of the labor laws have become superflous and even harmful to the purpose of increasing productivity. As a result, they took a series of steps relaxing enforcement of the labor discipline laws, imposing court penalties for violations of these laws on a selective basis, and, finally, by the decree of April 25, 1956, abolishing such court penalties altogether. With this decree the Soviet authorities have openly expressed their awareness that

[1] *Vedomosti verkhovnovo soveta SSSR*, No. 10 (852), May 8, 1956 (hereinafter cited as *Vedomosti*). The full title of the decree is: "On Abolishing Court [*sudebnii*] Liability of Wage Earners and Salaried Workers for Leaving Employ of Enterprises and Institutions Without Permission and for Absence From Work Without Valid Reason."

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the quality and quantity of a worker's output depends in the last analysis on his willingness to work.

The present article attempts to analyze these recent developments in labor law, which culminated in the decree of April 1956. Although not enough time has yet elapsed to permit evaluation of the enforcement of the provisions of this decree, a short historical review will serve to introduce a discussion of some of the reasons for its promulgation and some of the possible effects.

The Tightening of Labor Discipline

ALTHOUGH the Soviet Labor Code of 1922 is still theoretically in force, a number of later laws altered its original liberal and progressive features, which were an outgrowth of the spirit of the early years of the Revolution. In order to combat labor turnover and absenteeism, various restraining measures were successively applied by the Soviet authorities.[2] This process was climaxed by a series of decrees promulgated between 1938 and 1940, the most important of which were probably the Decrees of the Council of People's Commissars dated December 20, 1938,[3] and of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 26, 1940.[4]

The first decree introduced the "labor book," a detailed document containing personal data, a record of all the worker's job changes, and the reasons for such changes. The labor book, together with the internal passport, must be presented by the worker before he can be hired, and it is kept by management as long as the worker is employed at the same place. A new entrant to the labor force must present either a certificate from the administration of the house in which he lives or from his village Soviet, indicating his last occupation. Within a period of five days, management is then obliged to issue him his first labor book.

According to the second decree, now abolished, a worker was forbidden to leave his job or to accept another without prior permission of the management. The heads of enterprises were permitted and obligated to allow the departure of an employee in only a few instances specified by law. An employee who had arbitrarily left his job could be brought to trial and was subject to a sentence of from two to four months' imprisonment by a people's court. Managers who failed to submit to the court the names of persons guilty of unauthorized departure, or who gave work to such "fugitives," were themselves liable to court prosecution.

Another section of this decree rendered those guilty of unexcused absence from work (so-called *progul*) liable to court action and to punishment by "corrective labor at their place of work" for a period not to exceed six months, with reduction of not more than 25 per cent of their wages. This section was bolstered by a provision of the Standard Rules (*Tipovye pravila*) for the Internal Organization of Labor, under which an employee's late arrival at work, late return from lunch, or early departure was considered a *progul* if more than twenty minutes of work time was lost.[5] Such infractions resulting in a loss of less than twenty minutes' work time were deemed a *progul* if they occurred three times in the course of a month or four times in the course of two months.

A series of decrees promulgated in October 1940 extending the regime's control of the labor force to the recruiting stage remains basically in force today. Among them, a decree of October 2, 1940, established an elaborate network of trade, railroad, and factory schools to provide vocational training for boys up to 19 years of age and girls up to 18 years.[6] The decree also authorized conscription in the event that there were too few volunteers. During their training, students are not allowed to leave either the school or their work without permission. Under a decree of December 28, 1940, those who do leave can be sentenced by court action to detention in a penal labor colony for a period not exceeding one year.[7] Graduates of these vocational schools are obliged to work wherever directed by the authorities for four consecutive years at regular pay.[8]

Specialists graduating from universities and schools of higher education (*vuzy*) and from vocational

[2] This development is analyzed in the following works: S. M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1952, pp. 95 *ff.*; V. Gsovski, "Elements of Soviet Labor Law," *Monthly Labor Review*, March and April, 1951; G. C. Guins, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*, The Hague, 1954, pp. 150–181; W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Regime*, Syracuse, New York, 1954, pp. 333–404.

[3] *Izvestia*, December 21, 1938, as quoted in *Osnovnye zakonadatel'nye akty o trude rabochikh i sluzhashchikh*, (Basic Legislation Concerning the Work of Wage Earners and Salaried Workers), Moscow, 1955 (hereinafter cited as *Osnovnye akty*), pp. 15–17.

[4] *Vedomosti*, 1940, No. 20.

[5] Enacted January 15, 1941. *Sobranie postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii pravitel'stva SSSR* (Collection of Decisions and Decrees of the Government of the USSR), 1941, No. 4, text 63 (hereinafter referred to as *Sobranie*), cited in *Spravochnik profsoiuznovo rabotnika* (Trade Union Workers Handbook), Moscow, 1953, pp. 105–109 (hereinafter cited as *Spravochnik*).

[6] *Vedomosti*, No. 37, October 9, 1940, cited in M. S. Rozofarov (ed.), *Trudovye rezervy SSSR*, (The Labor Reserves of the USSR)- Moscow, 1950, p. 3.

[7] *Vedomosti*, No. 1, 1941, cited in M. S. Rozofarov (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[8] *Vedomosti*, No. 37, October 9, 1940.

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secondary schools (*tekhnikumy*) are treated similarly to workers graduating from the trade, railroad, and factory schools. They are obliged to work at places and at tasks assigned to them by the authorities, but only for three years.[9]

It is interesting to note here the sophistry of Soviet jurists who argue that no compulsion is involved because the orders directing the graduates to work are based on their prior consent. This consent, the jurists argue, is given tacitly by all students on entering the educational institution by the mere fact of registration: a Soviet student should know what is expected of him after graduation.[10]

First Signs of Relaxation

BEFORE the publication of the decree of April 25, 1956 there had been some speculation among Western experts about whether the restrictive stipulations of the decree of June 26, 1940, had been revoked since the war. For while the decree's provisions restricting freedom of employment were reprinted in the compendia of Soviet labor law published up to 1955, all compendia published since 1951 omitted the decree's penal stipulations.[11] All substantive evidence indicates, however, that they were not revoked, but only partially amended, as if in preparation for the more radical changes of the 1956 decree.

This amendment did not mean the discontinuance of court penalties. Evidence from Soviet sources indicated that such penalties were imposed right up to the promulgation of the new decree. The decree of April 1956 made the point completely clear by stipulating that persons sentenced under the old law are to be freed and all cases pending in court are to be dropped. (Articles 2 and 3.)

On the other hand, while the courts thus retained jurisdiction in enforcing labor discipline, the method of applying the court penalties changed. First, not everyone accused of *progul* was brought to court, but only those who were considered recidivists—that is, "incorrigible" or "malicious" violators. Secondly, the penalties imposed were less severe than those envisaged in the legislation of 1940. Thirdly, the managers were apparently given a certain amount of discretion in their choice of sanctions.

Whereas the Decree of June 26, 1940, prescribed "compulsory labor at the place of work" as the penalty for *progul*, the Soviet press reported that workers were often simply dismissed for this offense.[12] As if in anticipation of the Decree of April 25, 1956, N. G. Aleksandrov wrote in the February 1956 issue of the new monthly *Sotsialisticheskii trud* (Socialist Labor) that the following "juridical" measures were used against those guilty of *progul:* admonition, reprimand, temporary transfer to a less remunerative job, temporary deprivation of bonuses for seniority, and dismissal.[13]

Other press reports indicated that comparable leniency was practiced in the imposition of penalties even for leaving a job without permission. Whereas the above-mentioned decree prescribed imprisonment as the only penalty, the courts imposed more lenient sentences, *e.g.*, four months' compulsory labor at the place of work,[14] or even a monetary fine.[15]

The Soviet press reports indicated that the managers themselves could dismiss those guilty of violating labor discipline, but that more severe penalties had to be imposed by the people's court. The new responsibilities given the managers also created new difficulties for them; they were scolded in the press for unjustified dismissals as well as for not using their best judgment in deciding whether they should transmit a case to the court.[16]

[9] *Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii pravitel'stva SSSR* (Collection of Laws and Decrees of the USSR Government, No. 47, 1930, Article 488, (hereinafter referred to as *Sobranie zakonov*); N. G. Aleksandrov, A. E. Pasherstnik, *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Labor Law), Moscow, 1952, pp. 147–49.

[10] G. K. Moskalenko, *Stalinskaia knostitutsia i osnovy zakonodatel'stva o trude* (The Stalin Constitution and Fundamental Legislation Concerning Labor), Moscow, 1947, p. 7, quoted with approval by A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na trud* (The Right to Work), Moscow, 1951, p. 176 f. n.

[11] E. g. *Spravochnik*, 1953; N. G. Aleksandrov, *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Labor Law), Moscow, 1954; *Osnovnye akty*, 1955.

[12] *E.g.*, P. Semenov, "With the Connivance of the Trade Union Central Committee," *Trud*, October 14, 1955; I. Vetrov, "Concerning Defense of Citizens' Labor Rights," *Izvestia*, September 1, 1955; Girish Chandra, "Our Visit to a Soviet People's Court," *News*, No. 3, February 1, 1955, p. 20. V. Grygoren reports that the Construction Trusts of one Belorussian Ministry fired 339 workers for *progul*. See "Socialist Labor Discipline," *Kommunist Belarusi*, No. 7, July, 1955, p. 66.

[13] "For Further Strengthening Socialist Legality in Labor Relations," p. 43. *Socialist Labor* is a new monthly published by the State Committee for the Problems of Labor and Wages.) This relaxation had previously been implicitly confirmed by Minister Gorshenin in an article, "The Soviet Court and Its Role in Strengthening Socialist Law," in *Kommunist*, No. 2, January, 1955, p. 70, as well as in a pamphlet by A. Liapin: *O sotsialisticheskoi organizatsii i distsiplinie truda* (On Socialist Organization and Labor Discipline), Moscow, 1953, pp. 17–23.

[14] *Pravda Vostoka*, February 12, 1953.

[15] P. Stepanova, "Judicial Error," *Izvestia*, August 21, 1955.

[16] For example, an article in *Trud* (August 10, 1952) reproached a plant manager for having merely reprimanded one of his foremen although, as an "incorrigible violator" of labor discipline he should have been held criminally responsible. Another article in *Trud* (Yu. Kornilov, "Listening to the Verdict," February 21, 1954) reprimanded a factory manager for having sent two young workers to court without having first tried to correct their attitude by educational means.

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Until recently there was no indication of the legal basis for distinctions among different categories o violators, for the new leniency of penalties compared with those prescribed by the 1940 legislation, and for the discretion given to managers in the implementation of penalties. But in 1955 articles in two Soviet Central Asian newspapers referred for the first time to a Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, dated July 14, 1951, which clearly dealt with the enforcement of labor discipline.[17] This decree has never been officially published, and its exact provisions are still unknown. It is only because the new Decree of April 25, 1956 explicitly revokes it that we have learned its title: "On Substituting Disciplinary Measures and Public Influence in Place of Court (*sudebnii*) Liability of Wage Earners and Salaried Workers for Absence From Work [*progul*] Except in Cases of Repeated and [or] Prolonged Absence.[18]

[17] N. Yatskovskii, "To Maintain Socialist Legality Firmly," *Pravda Vostoka*, June 22, 1955; M. Arshinchikov, "To Maintain Labor Discipline," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, November 11, 1955.

[18] *Vedomosti*, No. 10 (852), May 8, 1956. See Article 8, paragraph (d).

Thus it is apparent that the 1951 Decree amended the Decree of June 26, 1940 in the direction of more lenient penalties for *progul* only. The juridical basis for the modified application (previous to the decree of April 1956) of penalties for those who quit jobs voluntarily is still unknown.

There are two possible reasons why the Soviet authorities did not publish the decree of 1951. First, the Soviet leaders may have feared that a publicized modification of labor discipline would adversely effect the system of control over labor, and they may have hoped that such an effect could be avoided if changes were introduced gradually and inconspicuously. Secondly, they probably considered the milder forms of enforcing labor discipline as an experiment, and hesitated to embody them in published decrees which it might be awkward to revoke.

Emergence of an Urban Proletariat

THERE is no single answer to explain why these steps to moderate the most restrictive stipulations of the labor laws were taken. Some Soviet sources have implied in recent years that drastic penal

A SEVERE CHIEF

—You've already received six warnings. If you're late once again—you'll get a seventh . . .

—From *Krokodil*, Moscow, July 20, 1954.

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sanctions to enforce the labor-discipline laws were no longer necessary because of the end of war conditions.[19] Other Soviet writers have asserted that changes in the social order resulting from the Revolution, coupled with the increased influence of Communist ideology, have created a better-disciplined working force. The preamble to the decree of April 25, 1956, itself states: "Labor discipline at enterprises and institutions has been strengthened as a result of the growth in the working people's consciousness and the rise in their living standards and cultural level. . . ."[20]

An analysis of the factors involved shows, however, that these contentions cannot be accepted without serious qualifications. For while it is true that the most repressive laws were put into effect on the eve of World War II, the process of limiting the workers' freedom was begun in the late 1920's during the First Five-Year Plan and was accelerated in the atmosphere of terror created by the purges of the 1930's. Furthermore, while the statement about the rise in material well-being is correct to a certain extent, the improved self-discipline of the workers is due little to their "growing consciousness." As for the rise in cultural standards, this stems largely from changes in the composition and character of the working class.

This change in the character of the Soviet working class is due to progress in its cultural and technical level and to the fact that the recent additions to the industrial labor force are vastly different from those who were drawn into industry before and just after the war. The forced economic expansion upon which Soviet planners embarked with the Five-Year Plans was made possible only by an immense transfer of manpower from agricultural to industrial occupations.[21] The Soviet authorities, facing the problem of adapting great masses of peasants to the discipline of factory life, believed that harsh and relentless measures of coercion were necessary.

But since the late 1930's (and with the exception of the immediate postwar period), the influx of peasants into the cities has declined. By the late 1940's and early 1950's the process of assimilation of the new arrivals was well advanced; the recruits who still arrived from the country entered into a functioning urban industrial system run by a hard core of experienced workers who had already been driven through the school of factory routine. The majority of the new workers were the children of workers and were already urbanized. The fact that the labor force was thus at a higher cultural and educational level than previously, and the consequent transformation of the Soviet working class into a modern proletariat, may have given the Soviet authorities the impulse to revise their policy and to shift the emphasis in the direction of less constraint and more persuasion. The authorities undoubtedly felt that the degree of coercion exercised earlier was no longer required. Indeed, they may have feared that the new generation of workers would be less amenable to continued rigorous discipline than previous generations had been, and that excessive pressure would be self-defeating and might even endanger all forms of social control.

Technological Advance

HOWEVER, a more important key to the recent moderation in labor policy can be found in the technological advances which have radically transformed Soviet industry during the past three decades and which have been reflected in the changing methods used to improve labor efficiency—*Udarnichestvo*, *Stakhanovism*, and *Novatorstvo*.

Udarnichestvo, or shock work, was dominant during the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1933). At this time the technical equipment of Soviet industry was still primitive, the efficiency of the workers at an extremely low level, and thus much could be achieved by speeding up production through sheer intensification of mass labor. By the mid-1930's Soviet industry was receiving increasing amounts of modern machinery, and it became of supreme importance to ensure the most productive use of this machinery. Soviet economists realized that the production increases which could be achieved by merely intensifying the physical efforts of the workers had reached the point of diminishing returns.

In 1935 *Stakhanovism* was introduced and it remained for almost two decades the chief Soviet method for improving labor efficiency. Under the Stakhanovite system the individual worker was encouraged to exceed the work norm by using both his physical strength and his special skill. The new system quickly became one of the most loathed features of the regime, for the mass of workers resented *Stakhanovism* for what it was—an intolerable speedup. Yet in the campaign for increased production, *Stakhanovism* was a step forward because it focused the attention of the workers on the importance of mastering technique and on improving working processes.

[19] E. g., A. Grigoriev, "Labor Discipline in a Socialist Society," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1954, p. 35.

[20] *Vedomosti*, No. 10 (852), May 8, 1952. For full title of the decree see note 1, above.

[21] About 25 million people moved from rural to urban areas during the period 1926–1939. See Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," in A. Bergson (ed.), *Soviet Economic Growth*, New York, 1953, p. 114.

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After the reconstruction following World War II, Soviet industry entered a period of rapid technological progress. More modern machinery and equipment were installed and automation was extended to many branches of production. It became clear that the progress possible through improved technology combined with better organization of the production process was almost unlimited.[22] As a result, *Stakhanovism* underwent modifications: the emphasis shifted more and more from physical effort, individual pace-making and record-breaking to the search for new working processes leading to technical progress, and the mastering and widespread application of these processes. This became the first duty of the so-called "leading workers," given the new name *Novatory* (The Innovators). For a year or two the term *Novatorstvo* (Innovation) coexisted with *Stakhanovism* (which in this transitional period was often called "mass *Stakhanovism*") and then replaced it almost entirely. Since 1953 there have been practically no references to *Stakhanovism* in Soviet sources.[23]

The more moderate approach to the problem of labor discipline can thus be seen as a direct result of the changes in industrial technology. When it became obvious that crude compulsion could not force the workers to use their abilities and intelligence to the fullest, encourage them to show initiative in improving technological processes, or even simply to cooperate with good will in the complexities of modern production, administrative pressure and repressive measures became less useful. Under the new technological conditions they have to be applied with moderation—even at the price of a certain loss of working time or an undesirable degree of labor mobility.

The relaxation in enforcing penalties for certain breaches of labor discipline also relates to the general trend in recent Soviet legislation toward reduced penalties for minor infractions of the law. The Amnesty Decree of March 27, 1953, expressed the government's intention to re-examine Soviet criminal laws with a view to substituting administrative and disciplinary measures for criminal responsibility for certain offenses of a minor nature.[24]

[22] Soviet economists showed a realization of these facts as early as 1940. See, for example, O. A. Ermanskii, *Stakhanovskoe dvizhenie i stakhanovskie metody* (The Stakhanovite Movement and Stakhanovite Methods), Moscow, 1940, pp. 299 *ff*.

[23] The appeal to the sporting instincts of rivalry, in the form of so-called "socialist emulation," has remained, however, in full force.

[24] *Pravda*, March 28, 1953 (see especially Article 8); similar views were expressed by K. Gorshenin. See *op. cit.*, pp. 63–4.

The Situation After the New Decree

DESPITE the reduced emphasis on penal sanctions in the enforcement of the labor discipline laws, the Soviet worker has not gained full freedom of employment. At first glance, for example, the new decree of April 25, 1956, seems to permit the workers greater freedom of movement. Article 5 permits workers to quit their jobs if they give two weeks' notice.[25] But with certain exceptions such a worker must forfeit his seniority, *i. e.*, credits accumulated for continuous service, by which social security benefits are calculated. Also, Article 1 abolishes court penalties for *progul*. On the other hand, the decree lists the following penalties for *progul*, which are to be imposed by management: (1) disciplinary measures in accordance with the rules for internal labor organization (article 7, paragraph a);[26] (2) deprivation of various money bonuses for seniority (*za vyslugu let*) for a period of up to three months or a cut of up to 25 percent of the lump sum bonus for seniority (article 7, paragraph b); (3) dismissal, the reasons to be indicated in the worker's labor book; the dismissed worker also forfeits his seniority (*stazh nepreryvnoi raboty*) with respect to benefits for temporary incapacity to work (article 7, paragraph v). In lieu of applying these measures, management has the option of submitting cases of *progul* to a court of coworkers, the so-called "comrades court."

In addition, the Soviet authorities still have at their disposal a whole array of measures by which they can maintain their control over labor and check labor mobility and absenteeism. It is true that, in principle, employment is now terminable by the employee, which means a return to the pre-1940 situation. But even before the decree of June 26, 1940, "floating" from job to job was considered condemnable, and great pressure has been exerted by the party, the trade unions, and management to prevent it.

Control over the labor force will still be aided by the labor book, which will now revert to the role it played before the promulgation of the decree of June 26, 1940. When the labor book was first introduced in 1938, its purpose was thus explained by an editorial in *Izvestia* (December 22, 1938):

The labor book brings order into the control of the labor force and becomes a powerful lever for the reinforcement of discipline and the liquidation of mobility in

[25] For a complete reference see note 1, above.

[26] These include admonitions and reprimands as well as the right of management to transfer the culprit to other, lower-paid work for a period of up to three months, or to demote him to a lower post. (See Article 20 of the decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, *Sobranie zakonov*, 1941, No. 4, text 63, cited in *Spravochnik*, pp. 105–109.)

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A SENSITIVE SOUL

—You, because you're friends, I'll send together to work in Khabarovsk.
—And our wives?
—Because they're girlfriends, I don't want to separate them either, and I'll send them both to Lvov!

(*Caption, above right:* There are occasions when the commission for the distribution of jobs to young specialists who have finished technical schools [*vuz*] separates husbands and wives and sends them to work in different cities).

—From *Krokodil*, Moscow, February 20, 1952.

manpower. . . . Thus we shall be able to distinguish immediately the man who goes about from one factory to another disorganizing production from the honest worker.

The fact that the labor book gives a prospective employer (as well as government authorities) the full record of job transfers as well as the reasons for such transfers undoubtedly restrains the individual worker, who does not want to be branded a "disorganizer of production," from changing jobs.

The new decree, furthermore, by explicitly violating the principle of Article 10 of the 1938 decree introducing the labor book, gives management another weapon to use in disciplining the worker. Whereas this article clearly stipulates that penalties for violations of labor discipline are not to be recorded in the labor book, according to Article 7, paragraph c, of the decree of April 25, 1956, one of the penalties for *progul* is "dismissal from work with an indication in the labor book that the worker had been dismissed for *progul* without valid reasons."

Social Insurance as a Sanction

IN addition to the above measures, the manipulation of social insurance benefits is a potent weapon in the hands of the regime. Soviet social insurance laws contain provisions which are intended to aid the enforcement of labor discipline, particularly by preventing unauthorized labor mobility. This is frankly stated in Soviet studies of the social insurance system,[27] as well as in government, party, and trade union resolutions. The USSR Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B), and the All-Union Central Council of the Trade Unions in a joint decision of December 28, 1938 (re-emphasized in recent Soviet writings), pointed out that it was neces-

[27] *E.g.*, A. S. Krasnopolskii, *Osnovnye printsipy sovetskovo gosudarstvenovo sotsialnovo strakhovaniia* (Basic Principles of Soviet State Social Insurance), Moscow, 1951, pp. 134 *ff.*; E. N. Korshunova and A. S. Krasnopolskii, *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo i voprosy proizvoditelnosti truda* (Soviet Labor Law and Problems of Labor Productivity), Moscow, 1955, p. 156.

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sary to introduce changes in the social insurance rules **... so that in the future equal consideration for conscientious workers and for idlers and floaters would not be permitted; so that only honestly working wage-earners and salaried employees would be encouraged, but not those who undermine labor discipline and lightly run from one place of work to another.** [28]

The benefits for permanent disability, when it is caused by illness or by an accident unconnected with the person's employment, are contingent not only upon a cumulative work record of a certain number of years (two to fifteen years, varying according to the age, sex, and occupation of the disabled), but also upon the number of years of uninterrupted employment at the same enterprise. Up to now, workers who have had a record of between three to fifteen years of uninterrupted service at their last job were eligible for an increase in their pension payments of between 10 and 25 percent.[29] A new draft law concerning state pensions, submitted by the Council of Ministers to the Supreme Soviet for ratification and scheduled to go into effect on October 1, 1956, introduces a change in these provisions. It provides a pension supplement of 10 percent to pensioners who have a record of 10 to 15 years service on the same job, and a supplement of 15 percent to those who have a record of over 15 years. [30]

[28] E. N. Korshunova and A. S. Krasnopolskii, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[29] Paragraph 18 of the decision of December 28, 1938, taken jointly by the USSR Council of Ministers, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (B), and the All-Union Central Committee of the Trade Unions, quoted in *Spravochnik*, p. 446.

[30] *Pravda*, May 9, 1956.

Similar provisions regulate benefits payable upon death of the breadwinner. In respect to old age, Article 8 of the new draft law introduces a bonus equal to 10 percent of the pension to workers with a record of continuous service on the same job for over 15 years.

For the past two decades, the rules regulating compensation for illness and temporary incapacity have been based on the principle that benefits should encourage the worker to remain at the same job and that benefit rates should depend upon unbroken employment. In the 1920's all wage and salary earners were entitled, in principle at least, to sick benefits equal to the full amount of their wages. Gradual changes in the principles of social insurance took place and, by the early 1930's, sick benefits had been made contingent upon length of service on the job where the disability occurred.[31] This feature of Soviet social insurance has been given increasing weight in a number of subsequent revisions of sick benefit rates, the latest of which was enacted in 1955. The table on this page shows rate changes in the period 1938–55 (the figures given are for trade union members; non-union workers receive only half these amounts, an instance of the pressure applied to induce workers to join the unions). As the chart indicates, the new regulations of 1955 abolish full sick benefits (*i.e.*, 100 percent of salary) altogether and make it necessary for employees to work substantially longer periods of time to collect lesser benefits. It might also be noted that the regulation barring employees

[31] Cf. Solomon M. Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 310–13.

Sick Benefit Rates for Trade Union Members

Length of Employment on One Job	Rate Scale (in percent of Salary)		
	1938 [1]	1948 [2]	1955 [3]
Up to 6 mos	0	0	0
6 mos.–3 yrs	50–60	50	50
3–5 yrs	80	60	60
5–6 yrs	80	80	70
6–8 yrs	100	80	70
8–12 yrs	100	100	80
12 yrs. and up	100	100	90

[1] *Sobranie*, No. 1, 1939, as quoted in S. M. Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 314–5.

[2] *Spravochnik*, p. 412. See also V. A. Goloshchapov, *Raschety s rabochimi i sluzhashchimi* (Accounts with Wage Earners and Salaried Workers), Moscow, 1954, pp. 127–8.

[3] Decision of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, January 28, 1955, quoted in E. N. Korshunova and A. S. Krasnopolskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 157–8, f. n. See also A. A. Gratsianov, *Spravochnik bukhgaltera po raschetam s rabochimi i sluzhaschimi* (Bookkeepers' Handbook for Accounts with Wage Earners and Salaried Workers), Moscow, 1955, pp. 119–20.

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from any sick benefits until they have worked six months on a new job has since 1938 applied to workers who were dismissed from former employment for violating labor discipline or for other offenses, as well as to those who left at their own request.[32] This stipulation has been reemphasized in Article 6 of the new decree of April 1956.

Rewards and Pressures

TO complement their manipulations of material incentives Soviet authorities use prestige symbols, honorific distinctions (medals, titles, etc.) and the moral pressure of what can be called "organized shame" directed against condemnable behavior. This is done in a number of ways. For example, factory wall newspapers castigate and ridicule workers guilty of violating labor discipline by printing reprimands, sarcastic comments, satirical poems, caricatures, *etc.* There are sometimes "Chairs of Disgrace" in factory dining halls. In addition to "Boards of Honor" there are in many enterprises "Boards of Dishonor," which list those guilty of *progul*. These devices have been institutionalized and manipulated to an extent unknown in other societies. Indeed, this use of moral suasion has a long history in Soviet industrial relations. Twenty years ago the leading British trade unionist Sir Walter Citrine visited several Soviet factories and expressed himself as "thoroughly incensed at the subtle cruelty of this system," and he told his Soviet guides that a decent trade union "would not stand to see these men insulted." [33]

Soviet trade unions, however (with the obvious assistance of the party and management) have continued to manipulate the "social pressure" of fellow workers, and today this method of indirect coercion is recommended with a new emphasis as a method of enforcing labor discipline. The Eleventh All-Union Congress of Soviet Trade Unions (held in Moscow on June 7–15, 1954) amended union statutes so that instead of merely observing labor discipline, every trade union member is now also obliged to "fight against any kind of manifestation of lack of discipline in the enterprise."[34] N. V. Popova, who presented the amendments to the Congress, declared:

[It is] absolutely clear that it is impossible to have a compromising attitude toward these bearers of the survivals of capitalism [the violators of labor discipline]. It is necessary for the whole mass of the members of the trade unions to arouse public opinion against them. . . .[35]

This new duty of the trade union member is frequently reiterated in different words; for instance:

. . . [a trade union member must] not only work conscientiously himself, but be implacable toward violators and disorganizers of the enterprise, [and] arouse public opinion and create an intolerable situation for the loafers and idlers. . . .[36]

Although public pressure is represented as a spontaneous expression of "social disapproval" by fellow workers, it is very obviously stage-managed by the authorities. Soviet periodicals carry incessant exhortations to workers "to rouse public opinion against truants,"[37] to create "an atmosphere of intolerance toward malicious disorganizers of production,"[38] to issue "fighting leaflets" and wall-newspapers, and "to make known to everybody in the factory the names of the violators."[39] Transgressions of individual workers are discussed at factory meetings at which

. . . there is usually a big crowd present and the violator [of labor discipline] is so rebuked that he is ashamed; [and] it is clear that such a [man]'s] . . . promises not to violate labor discipline again are not empty words.[40]

* * *

IN sum, the new trend in Soviet labor policy, although important as far as it goes, is of limited scope. Workers may terminate employment more easily than before, but the authorities are still able to control labor mobility by the labor book, by an intensified use of manipulated "public opinion," by curtailment of social security benefits and by various administrative pressures inherent in the system. The employment of vocational school graduates is still directed for a four-year period, and non-compliance makes the culprit liable to penal action. The most severe penalties for absenteeism have been repealed, but the worker is still subject to a host of disciplinary measures. Any collective action in defense of workers' rights and particularly the right to strike is unthinkable under Soviet totalitarianism. The Soviet workingman remains under coercion without parallel in the West.

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[32] Decision of December 28, 1938. Quoted in *Spravochnik*, p. 409.

[33] Sir Walter Citrine, *I Search the Truth in Russia*, London, 1936, pp. 87, 330–31.

[34] *Trud*, June 12, 1954.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] D. Davidov, "The Members of the Trade Unions, Their Rights and Duties," *Sovetskie profsoiuzy*, No. 9, September, 1954, p. 62.

[37] "The National Movement to Raise Labor Productivity," *Kommunist*, No. 11, July, 1954, pp. 6–7.

[38] "Observe Labor Discipline," *Izvestia*, August 6, 1952.

[39] I. Goncharova, "Relying on the Collective," *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 1, April, 1954, p. 66.

[40] M. Babikov in "Why Didn't They Answer Our Letter?" *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 7, April, 1955, p. 61; see also "Incessantly Educate the Soviet People in the Spirit of Communist Morality," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September, 1954, p. 5.

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New Era in Soviet Architecture?

By PAUL WILLEN

IN the mid-1930's, when the Soviet government was in the process of stifling modern architecture in favor of classicism and monumentality, the great American architect Frank Lloyd Wright visited the USSR. Expecting to find Soviet architects in the vanguard of modernism, he was appalled to discover their growing veneration for the styles of ancient Greece, Imperial Rome, Gothic England, and Victorian Europe. Obviously embarrassed by what they were doing, the Soviet architects cynically told Wright, "Never mind, we will tear it down in ten years." Wright replied that it would take all of ten years to finish the contemplated Palace of Soviets—designed to be more massive than the Egyptian pyramids and higher than the Empire State Building. "Never mind," they said again, "we may tear that down too, even before we finish it." [1]

The gigantic Palace of Soviets was indeed never finished; but a thousand other solemn and monumental structures, aping the worst features of nineteenth century eclectic architecture, were constructed in the next twenty years. If many Soviet architects hoped that after World War II it would be possible to return to a more modest and functional style, their hopes were in vain. Under the leadership of the ultra-conservative Academy of Architects, and with the encouragement of the government, Soviet architecture relied even more heavily on ancient styles, massive display, ornamental extravagance.[2] Western architecture was subjected to unceasing attack for its allegedly "nihilistic" rejection of the "heritage of the past." In fact, the leading Soviet classicist, Zholtovsky, said in 1949 that there had been no worthwhile architecture in the West since the days of Inigo Jones and Christopher Wren, and he characterized American architecture as "outside art." [3]

Postwar Soviet construction continued to give form to the reactionary esthetic philosophy expressed by Commissar of Education Lunacharsky in 1932, when he advised Soviet architects to design "socialist" buildings "saturated with ideology"—buildings embodying the "grandeur, permanence and might" of the Soviet state. New apartment houses in every Soviet and satellite city were planned to resemble medieval fortresses, Florentine palaces or Byzantine churches; East Berlin's broad Stalinallee was flanked by huge and imposing apartment buildings; the lofty arches spanning the Volga-Don Canal were erected in Napoleonic style; and great pyramidal skyscrapers rose in Moscow and Warsaw: all these were intended as permanent "challenges" to the more simple structures of free men. The process of piling extravagance upon extravagance appeared to be without limit, witness the report of a Yugoslav journalist who visited a Crimean resort last summer:

> **The sanatorium is only 106 meters from the sea, but nevertheless it has its own swimming pool with sea water and its own funicular railway running from the building to the sea. . . . The biggest building of the sanatorium is not used for living space at all! The Russians themselves do not know why they need this building.[4]**

A Call for "Common Sense"

SUDDENLY, however, the reevaluation forecast to Frank Lloyd Wright twenty years earlier was thrust upon Soviet architects. Typical of Soviet procedure, it was First Secretary of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev who announced that the time for a reckoning had come. Speaking on December 7, 1954, before a meeting of architects and builders gathered in Moscow, Khrushchev swept away the whole ideology of architectural "monumentality" with one shrewd question: "Where is the common sense, where is the economic logic?" And he went on to reformulate

[1] Frank Lloyd Wright, "Architecture and Life in the USSR" *Architectural Record*, October 1937, p. 59.

[2] See Paul Willen, "Soviet Architecture: Progress and Reaction," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. II, No. 6, 1953, pp. 28–30, for photographs of some of these postwar buildings.

[3] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, May 1, 1949.

[4] *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), August 30, 1955.

Mr. Willen has published numerous articles on Soviet political and cultural developments, several of which have appeared in previous issues of *Problems of Communism*.

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the precepts by which Soviet architects were henceforth to be guided.[5]

Previous Soviet doctrine had stated that external beauty is more important than internal function; Khrushchev lashed out at buildings in which "one cannot live and work." Previous doctrine had separated artistic and engineering considerations; Khrushchev called for an end to the "divorce of architecture from the vital tasks of construction." Previous doctrine had stressed the propaganda impact of a building; Khrushchev said the important thing was that "the people need apartments." Previous doctrine had stated that beauty derived only from stylized forms such as columns, porticos, friezes, cornices; Khrushchev said that beauty resulted from "the good proportions of the entire building . . . [from the] honest delineation of parts."

Everything he said on that memorable day flew in the face of the established doctrine and practice of twenty years, and he had not a word of praise for Lunacharsky's once-hallowed concept of "ideological saturation."

"You, Comrade Mordvinov, and your assistants," Khrushchev told the since-dismissed head of the Academy of Architects, "have stifled the voices raised against embellishments and sham details in architecture." The hall "rang with applause," and Khrushchev went on to describe a typical example of architectural extravagance. In Sverdlovsk a tower with a spire was erected in front of a city hall at a cost of over two million rubles. "Two schools for 400 pupils each could have been built with the funds expended on the spire alone," he said, then adding his cryptic comment, "Where is the economic logic?" Khrushchev was not the first to have raised the issue. But in the early 1930's the many architects who had posed this question were removed from posts of influence and their criticism silenced.[6]

The most pathetic figure in this situation was of course Arkady Mordvinov; and he had good reason to feel betrayed by the Kremlin leaders he had served so loyally. The fact was that he and his many "assistants" had only been following the June 1931 decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU on building construction, the April 1932 decree dissolving the modernist architectural associations, the May 1933 award of the Council on the Palace of Soviets (in which decision Stalin is alleged to have shared), the April 1935 CC decree on the reconstruction of Moscow, and many other subsequent decrees and pronouncements. Mordvinov suffered because, as leader of the architects, he was an easy target.

Delayed Reaction

IF Mordvinov was disgraced, other architects probably were pleased at the turn of events; they interpreted the new line as part of the generally more reasonable attitude adopted by the regime in many of its policies since Stalin's death. Why, then, was the process of readjustment so slow? Primarily because many architects could not understand the specific scope of Khrushchev's criticism. For Khrushchev had contented himself with attacking past practices as uneconomical; his demand that architectural policy be directed toward the "lowest cost per square meter" of construction hardly constituted a positive esthetic philosophy which architects could follow.

For almost a year Soviet architects dragged their feet, changing their methods only slightly. As late as June 1955 there were press reports of such cases as a Gorki architect's insistence—despite contrary orders from the Ministry of Inland Shipping—on the retention of a purely decorative tower in an apartment block. This situation was clearly untenable, and in November the Central Committee finally took action; a long decree signed by Khrushchev and Bulganin severely castigated the lethargic pace of change, reiterated the attack on extravagance and demanded immediate action by all state institutions.[7] The decree also announced a reformation of the architectural apparatus, the dismissal or downgrading of several dozen architects, and a program for the study of Western architecture. Among those dismissed or demoted were the designers of the famous Crimean Bridge in Moscow (Vlasov), the Volga-Don Canal (Polyakov), the stations of the Moscow Subway (Dushkin) and Moscow's tallest skyscraper (Chechulin).

The result of this stern decree was soon evident. Although the offensive buildings were not actually "torn down" as had been forecast to Wright, the prophecy was in part fulfilled. It was announced in Kiev a week after the decree was promulgated that plans to finish a skyscraper with a granite facade costing 1.7 million rubles would be scrapped. The building would have no facade at all.[8] Leningrad reported that plans for buildings already under construction would be thoroughly reexamined in the

[5] Khrushchev's speech was printed in *Pravda*, December 28, 1954.

[6] As late as 1934 the two Vesnin brothers, well-known modern architects, had collaborated with the leading modernist theorist, Ginzburg, to write an article restating their opposition to the prevailing trend. (*Arkhitektura SSSR*, No. 2, pp. 64–66.) None of the three men was ever again awarded a contract for the design of a Soviet building.

[7] *Pravda*, November 10, 1955.

[8] *Izvestia*, November 11, 1955.

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IN THE ARCHITECT'S HOME

—Mama, look what a cake papa's bought . . .
—What are you chattering about; that's the model of his new building.

—From *Krokodil*, Moscow, October 30, 1955.

light of the new principles of "simplicity" and "economy".[9] Indeed, a Leningrad official boasted that his organization (the City Planning Institute) had already "revised the designs of all apartment and public buildings on which [it had] been working."[10]

In Minsk it was admitted that many of the city's proud new apartment houses "are distinguished by a tasteless conglomeration of stucco details . . . and ponderous expensive colonnades," and drastic changes were promised.[11] In Rostov-on-the-Don it was acknowledged that a Farm Machinery Plant then under construction didn't really need a tower on one corner of the building and that the speed of plastering a dormitory wall could be doubled "if the architect had not stipulated numerous indentations in the walls that neither beautify the building nor make it sturdier."[12] A week later, a meeting of Leningrad architects indulged in an orgy of self-criticism, admitting many "cases of wastefulness." "The buildings erected on Revolutionary Square contain about a hundred columns. The cost of these decorations amounts to a fifth of the estimated total construction cost." In certain houses "even the boiler rooms have columns and pediments." Leningrad architects promised that plans for new buildings would henceforth put maximum emphasis on comfort.[13]

In Moscow it was announced that construction on the last of the great skyscrapers had been halted; those that were already finished were subjected to harsh stricture. Eager critics pointed out the tremendous waste involved in the Moscow Metro stations, the well-known Crimean vacation hotels, and the Volga-Don Canal previously hailed as one of the great "construction works of communism"). When the Union of Soviet Architects convened in Moscow on November 26, 1955, for its second Congress (the first was held in 1937, five years after the founding of the Union), the leading Soviet architects rose one by one to salute the new doctrines of economical construction, architectural simplicity and standardized building techniques. Comrade Mordvinov, former president of the Academy of Architecture, was allowed to speak, and submitted a few short words of apology for his past faulty leadership.[14]

Doctrinal Implications

LIKE many of the post-Stalin reforms, the change in Soviet architectural doctrine has raised as many questions as it has answered. To what degree have Stalinist architectural doctrines been abandoned, to what degree are they merely modified? How seriously will Soviet architects dare to take Khrushchev's injunction that they study Western architecture? Is there an inexorable connection between the architecture of "monumentality" and the totalitarian state?

On the basis of limited evidence, partial answers to some of these questions can be offered. The issues of *Arkhitektura SSSR* which have appeared since the November 1955 decree indicate that (1) the "heritage of the past" is definitely receiving much less attention than it did three years ago; (2) contemporary Western architecture is being treated with a respect and frank curiosity unknown in Soviet architectural

[9] *Izvestia*, November 12, 1955.
[10] *Pravda*, November 11, 1955.
[11] *Pravda*, November 12, 1955.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Leningradskaia Pravda*, November 17, 1955.
[14] A resume of the Congress appeared in *Arkhitektura SSSR*, No. 1, 1956, pp. 1–15.

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circles for twenty-five years; and (3) architectural writing and discussion is reverting to the use of professional terminology and getting away from the stilted jargon of Marxism-Leninism.

Particularly noteworthy is the renewed attention to Western architecture, which had long been treated as an expression of "finance capital." The October 1955 issue of *Arkhitektura SSSR* carried a long description of the June 1955 conference of the International Society of Architects, together with an illustrated objective survey of apartment house construction in France. The December issue contained a lengthy discussion of the reconstruction of the English city of Coventry. These were hopeful straws in the wind. As yet, however, the basic esthetic concepts of modern architecture do not appear to have penetrated either Soviet practice or theory.

What seems to have taken place thus far is merely a move away from extravagant decoration and embellishment. Soviet designs are plainer, more modest, less wasteful (a Moscow architect estimated in March 1956 that the redesigning of 800 buildings would save the city 230 million rubles).[15] The buildings are thus less awesome, the facades less imposing, less cluttered with statuary and frills. But basic design remains the same as in the 1930's; the stress is still on monumental classicism. The buildings retain that heaviness and massiveness which Lunacharsky called for in 1932. This architectural concept may well be criticized in the next year or two and also be abandoned; as yet, however, there is no clear evidence of such a trend. The official attitude toward "constructivism"—once the *bête noir* of Soviet architecture—is certainly less hostile, but neither is it friendly.[16]

Dodging the Issue

A TYPICAL expression of the official point of view was furnished by A. Mikhailov, a leading Soviet architect, in an article published last fall.[17] Mikhailov asserted that Soviet architecture had followed a healthy course of development prior to World War II, though he admitted there was some tendency toward extravagance of design in the 1930's. He quickly added that "certain" Soviet leaders had even then warned against the trend. (Two of the three men cited were Khrushchev and Bulganin; the third, Kaganovich, was ironically probably more responsible than any other man for the implementation of

ВОДОРАЗБОРНАЯ КОЛОНКА.
(По проекту архитектора Украшателева).

WATER PUMP
(According to Architect Decorator's Plan)
—From *Krokodil*, Moscow, November 30, 1955.

[15] Reported by Oveiko, Moscow's new chief architect (*Pravda*, March 10, 1956).

[16] Constructivism is a school of art founded in 1920, closely allied to engineering and architecture in that it champions the use of contemporary materials in art—steel, plastics, aluminum, *etc.*—and uses technical methods of construction. Like other modern schools, its emphasis on abstract expression was attacked by the Soviet regime as a defiance of the principles of "socialist realism," the officially-sanctioned art form of the Communist world. Reduced to simplest terms, the latter implies that the artist (or writer, or architect) must express "reality" in terms which are easily understood by the masses and which promote the official conception of the social order.

[17] *Arkhitektura SSSR*, No. 12, 1955, pp. 43–47.

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Stalinist monumental classicism.)[18] According to Mikhailov, it was not until 1943, when the elements led by Mordvinov "seized control" of the architectural academies and institutes, that the situation got out of hand.

This argument was a transparent attempt to assert the essential integrity of Soviet architecture. In a frantic effort to point the finger of blame anywhere but at monumental classicism itself, one year—1943—and one man—Mordvinov—have been selected as the scapegoats. Now that Stalin and some of his grandiose notions have been denounced by his successors, architectural critics may possibly be more candid than was Mikhailov writing last fall. But unless the regime is prepared to see the eclipse of the monumental style, it would do well to continue to insist that 1943 was the year the damage was initially done. For Mikhailov's article indicated that many concepts of "socialist realism" in architecture remain in force today, particularly the idea that certain stylized forms can produce an impressive beauty apart from their functional purpose. Mikhailov raised his voice especially against the notion, popular today among engineers and architects in Russia, that industrialization has produced a "new esthetic," although he himself implicitly supported at least a reformulation of concepts when he called for unity between "esthetic" and "constructional" elements.

If no positive architectural philosophy has emerged in the post-Stalin period, it is at least a happy sign that endless talk of "ideological purity" as the prime requisite of good building has been abandoned. With the exception of casual references to "socialist realism," architectural discussion has begun to reflect Khrushchev's stress on economy of construction, efficient use of materials, comfort of dwellers, and fulfillment of plans as the main criteria of success. This fact alone has given recent Soviet architectural writing a vivacity lacking for the past twenty years. But the discussion is still extremely limited in scope; the architects are as yet simply liberating themselves from the same rigid limits on their creativity which Western architects escaped a generation ago.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Government will be unable to devise a means of concealing from the public eye daily proof of the gross waste and pretension of Stalinist architectural policy. Stalin's books may be removed from the bookstores, and his paintings from the art museums. But the landscape of the Soviet empire—from Tirana to Vladivostok—is still dotted by the great "palaces" erected to celebrate the "grandeur, might and permanence" of the Stalinist epoch.

[18] The delegates to the Second Congress of Architects were told much the same story, *e.g.*: "At the First Congress of Soviet Architects, in 1937, Comrade N. A. Bulganin spoke of the harm done by facade fever. Comrade N. S. Khrushchev had pointed out even earlier that several architects were infatuated with externals in their designs and were completely detached from questions of economics." (Architects K. Ivanov and G. Minervin, "Rise to the Level of New Tasks," *Pravda*, November 26, 1955, p. 3.)

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Forced Labor in Communist China

By KARL A. WITTFOGEL

THE system of forced labor in Communist China reflects, in part, earlier Chinese ways; in part, it imitates the Soviet pattern. Yet, even where it continues a Chinese tradition, it embraces new Communist features.

This is readily apparent in the two broad categories of compulsory labor practiced in mainland China. Corvée labor, on which the Communist regime relies heavily to man large state-directed projects, represents a carry-over, significantly modified, of the traditional system. To this has been added corrective or "reformatory" labor, which is to China an essentially new and alien form borrowed from the USSR.

The Corvée

MAO'S regime established a legal basis for the use of corvée labor in Article 9 of the Common Program of 1949, which specified the performance of "public service" as one of the "duties" of every citizen of the Chinese People's Republic. By contrast, the wording of the 1954 Chinese Communist Constitution is less frank, Article 16 merely stipulating that "work is a matter of honor for every citizen"; but actual practice since the adoption of the constitution clearly indicates that the Communist regime is extending rather than reducing the scope of corvée labor.

Occasionally, the employment of labor conscription is interlocked with relief measures, as in the 1954 drafting of huge numbers of Yangtze River flood victims into corvée battalions dispatched elsewhere to work on railway construction projects.[1] In such cases, the borderline between "voluntariness" and compulsion may become somewhat obscure. In general, however, large government-directed projects in mainland China are carried out by means of manifestly obligatory ("honorific") labor, and Chinese Communist publications make little effort to conceal the fact.

Flood control and other hydraulic projects constitute one of the principal areas in which the Communist regime relies heavily on the corvée type of forced labor. At the end of 1951, Minister of Water Conservation Fu Tso-yi indicated that an average five million persons were being mobilized annually to work on water conservation projects.[2] Since then, the regime's capacity to draft and organize forced labor teams has evidently increased to a marked degree, for the official New China News Agency (NCNA) reported on May 16, 1955, that between February and May of that year, 4.4 million "civilian" laborers had worked on one segment of China's vast hydraulic system, the Yangtze River dikes.

The same methods are employed, with modifications, in mobilizing labor for the construction and maintenance of highways and railroads. For example, NCNA reported (May 15, 1955) that "48,000 kilometers of highways . . . have been regularly maintained and renovated by the organized masses," and another 32,000 kilometers "jointly maintained by the people and highway workers." Also, a 100,000-man construction force which worked on the Chengtu-Chungking railway between 1950 and 1952 included, by Communist admission, 84,000 "mobilized" civilians, local unemployed, and soldiers;[3] and 20,000

[1] *Forced Labor* (Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labor Office), United Nations Economic and Social Council, Doc. E/2815, December 15, 1955, p. 92 ff. (Hereafter cited as UNESC).

[2] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peiping, November 5, 1951. (Data and quotations from *Jen-min Jih-pao*, central organ of the Chinese CP, are from the Chinese original. References to other Chinese dailies are based on translations given in the three serial compilations of the U. S. Consulate General, Hongkong [*Current Background*, Survey of the *China Mainland Press*, *Review of Hongkong Chinese Press*], or in UNESC.)

[3] Chungking *Hsin-hua Jih-pao*, December 7, 1951.

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workers were conscripted in 1951–52 to build the Tienshui-Lanchow railway. [4]

To be sure, in an agro-hydraulic society such as China's, corvée labor has been employed since the dawn of history.[5] The Chinese Communists therefore are perpetuating an earlier condition—up to a point; and the qualification is important. The traditional corvée tended to assemble the drafted laborers in semi-military fashion. Now the whole organization of the corvée labor force is militarized down to the smallest work teams, and Soviet-initiated methods of Stakhanovism and "labor emulation" are used to whip up performance. While introducing these innovations, the Chinese Communists have chosen to ignore past ameliorative measures (under the last imperial dynasty and also, to some extent, under the Chinese republic) to pay corvée laborers or replace them by hired labor.

Corrective Labor—A Communist Innovation

WHEREAS the corvée has its antecedents in China's imperial past, "corrective" forced labor as applied by the Chinese Communists does not. The use of penal labor has, of course, long been customary in both East and West. The Chinese Communists, however, established penal "reform through labor" on a class basis and as a means of consolidating their political power. This approach, alien to the traditions of pre-Communist China, clearly follows the Soviet precedent.

The system of corrective labor, as developed in the USSR, was extended to the Sovietized Baltic countries in 1940 and to the Soviet European satellites in the years following World War II. In 1950–51, the Communist-run East European "people's democracies" made it a fundamental feature of their penal institutions—this action significantly coinciding with the inauguration of the first satellite Five-Year Plan.[6] It was also about this time that Communist China began employing corrective forced labor on a vastly increased scale.

A statement made by Mao Tse-tung on July 31, 1949, and Article 7 of the Common Program (September 29, 1949) are generally cited as signalling the start of the corrective labor system in Communist China. There is some justification for this view, but this does not mean that the Chinese Communists were unfamiliar with the concept prior to 1949 or had been above using it.

As early as 1934, when the first Chinese Soviet Republic ended, Mao announced that the Communist government was "reforming" prisoners by teaching them "labor discipline." [7] The number was probably inconsequential, for in the armed struggle against the National Government forces, the Communists found it easier to kill than to jail their captives. Conditions did not change much during the first part of the Yenan period, and the relatively moderate Communist policy of the second United Front years also tended—if in a quite different way—to limit the number of prisoners to be "reformed."

Liquidation rather than detention was again the preferred Communist policy during the fluid period of the renewed civil war after 1946. But, as early as January 1948, the idea of putting political enemies to work instead of killing them off suggested itself to the Communists in the "liberated" areas. It was implemented initially in the oldest such area, Manchuria, and became official Communist policy for the whole of mainland China with the adoption of the Common Program.

In his July 1949 statement, Mao had already named landlords, bureaucratic capitalists, and "the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang" as categories of persons who must be forced to correct themselves through labor. Article 7 of the Common Program formally prescribed this treatment for "counter-revolutionary elements, feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists in general", stating soothingly that such persons would thus be provided with a "means of livelihood" while learning "to become new men."

The earliest regulations governing the application of corrective labor penalties seem to have been contained in the "Directives for Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities" jointly issued on July 23, 1950, by the State Administration Council and Supreme People's Court.[8] A few months before, in March, the Communists had already established the first large corrective labor camp south of the Great Wall, the Chingho Farm.

Military and civilian adherents of the Nationalist Government and "bureaucratic capitalists" were the primary targets against whom the new weapon was

[4] Sian *Ch'un Chung Jih-pao*, December 1, 1951.

[5] See Karl A. Wittfogel, "Developmental Aspects of Hydraulic Societies," in *Irrigation Civilizations: A Comparative Study* (Social Science Monographs I, Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., 1955), pp. 45, 51 n. 4.

[6] UNESC, p. 340 ff.

[7] Victor A. Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets*, Coward-McCann, New York, 1954, p. 262.

[8] Li T'ien-min, *Wu-nien-lai chung-kung p'o-hai jen-ch'uan chi-shih* (Facts of Chinese Communist Suppression of Human Rights during the Last Five Years), Association of Chinese Comrades of the United Nations, Taipei, 1955 (hereafter cited as Li 1955), p. 21. See also *Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 3, 1951; UNESC, p. 129.

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initially turned. Then, as the regime's land reform campaign got under way in the East China and Central and South China areas in late 1950, regulations were issued specifying "hard labor" as the principal alternative to imprisonment for punishing recalcitrant landlords.[9]

Successive decrees and regulations during 1951–54 gradually broadened the application of corrective labor in accordance with the dictates of changing political exigencies. In February 1951, a Central People's Government decree provided for severe penalties directed primarily against persons charged with obstructing the Communist war effort in Korea. In 1952, when the "three-anti" and "five-anti" drives were launched against corrupt and "deviating" members of the new Communist bureaucracy and against "criminal" businessmen, "reform through labor" was again stipulated as one of the main punishments.[10]

Beginning in 1953, the peasants—who so recently had benefited from the regime's drive against the landlords—were themselves subjected to the threat of forced labor penalties if they objected to the government's increasingly exacting agricultural policies. When a grain-delivery strike developed in the countryside in the fall of that year, the government on November 19 countered with new regulations extending the definition of "counterrevolutionaries" to embrace uncooperative peasants. The regulations provided a ready club for enforcing peasant compliance with the accelerated program of agricultural collectivization ordered by the Central Committee of the CCP in its resolution of December 16, 1953.

Political Weapon Par Excellence

As a result of these piecemeal extensions, corrective forced labor had become, by 1954, a major punitive and coercive weapon of the regime, applicable to virtually any group of citizens. Businessmen were intimidated by it into submitting to rapidly-pushed nationalization of enterprise; workers into accepting an increasingly severe, quasi-military labor discipline. In 1954 the weapon was turned primarily against the new "counterrevolutionaries"—those peasants who either were unwilling to join producers' cooperatives or, if enrolled in them, did not show the proper zeal in fulfilling their collective obligations.

Official spokesmen of the Peiping regime have tried to obscure the social status of the new "counterrevolutionaries", but stray references in Communist news reports make it quite evident that many of them are peasants without any taint of a landlord or *kulak* background.[11] The obvious reticence of the officials regarding the class aspect, however, has not kept them from boasting on occasion that the regime's punitive organs were working overtime to put down "counterrevolutionary" unrest in the countryside.[12]

Doubtless because of its ever-widening application, the Chinese Communist system of corrective forced labor was eventually spelled out in a comprehensive set of rules. On August 26, 1954, the State Administration Council institutionalized the system by adopting the first detailed "Regulations Governing Reform through Labor." These were made public on September 7, together with a simultaneously-enacted measure dealing with the release, resettlement and employment of "reformed" prisoners and an explanatory report by Minister of Public Security Lo Jui-ching.[13]

Regulations, which (Lo stressed) had been prepared "with the assistance of Soviet legal experts," divide the bulk of adult prisoners into two principal categories. Those in the first category, "counterrevolutionary and other major criminals" either imprisoned for life or under deferred death sentence and unfit for outside labor, are required to work inside the prisons (Articles 13–14). Those in the second category, which embraces "convicted counterrevolutionary and other criminals" fit for outside labor, are to be placed in the "reformatory laborcorps" (Article 17). (The regulations avoid using the terms "camp" and "colony" customary in Soviet penal literature.)

"The reformatory labor corps," Article 18 stipulates, "shall organize prisoners for systematic productive work in agriculture, industry and reconstruction programs, and shall impart political education

[9] "Provincial Regulations Governing Punishment of Law-Breaking Landlords," issued September 1950 for East China, and November 1950 for Central and South China. (Texts in UNESC, p. 153.)

[10] "Decisions by the State Administration Council Concerning the Establishment of People's Tribunals during the Five-Anti Campaign," March 21, 1952; "Decisions [same as preceding] during the Three-Anti Campaign," March 28, 1952. (Texts in UNESC, p. 168 ff.)

[11] A New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA) report on May 19, 1955, for example, described one Chang Pien-tse, sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, as "the head of a [farm] labor team."

[12] Speech by Liu Wen-hui before National People's Congress, reported in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 29, 1955. See also Peiping *Huang-ming Jih-pao*, May 21, 1955.

[13] "Regulations Enacted in the People's Republic of China Governing Reform through Labor," August 26, 1954, text published by NCNA, September 7, 1954; hereafter cited as Regulations. Report by Lo Jui-ching at 222nd meeting of State Administration Council, August 26, 1954, also NCNA, September 7, 1954; hereafter cited as Lo 1954. (Cf. UNESC, pp. 177–89, 190–94.)

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in coordination with productive labor." The Lo report underlined the importance of this category as the "main type and most appropriate form of organized production by criminal labor."

In addition to the two main categories, the regulations also deal with "prisoners still under investigation or awaiting trial" and prisoners sentenced to less than two years' imprisonment, whose commitment to a reformatory labor corps may be inexpedient. Both these groups are to be placed in "houses of detention" and required to perform "appropriate labor" (Article 9). Finally, "young prisoners" between the ages of 13 and 18 are committed to "houses of correction," where they are required to "undertake light labor under conditions favorable to their physical development" (Article 22).

The 1954 regulations thus apply the principle of corrective forced labor all the way down the line, lumping together both political and ordinary criminals. Communist China, of course, has its share of the latter, and as in the Soviet Union they are frequently used by the prison or labor camp authorities as tools against the political prisoners. But political criminals clearly make up the core of the vast corrective labor force in mainland China. Official documents dealing with forced labor invariably mention political offenders first. Often they mention them only.

The Economic Aspect

OBVIOUSLY, then, corrective forced labor is a highly important institution in Communist China. The Communists publicly proclaimed its inception;

Corrective Labor—A Contrast of Views

As the Correctors Present It:

Consequently, not only is the policy of reforming criminals through labor supported by the whole nation, but many prisoners and their families have expressed their sincere gratitude. . . . They describe our reformatory labor institutions as "hospitals for thought reform and schools for technical training." Some say of them: "In the old society, good people were kept in prisons; in the new society, bad people are kept in prisons and become good in the process." Some others say: "We cannot discipline our children; the Government can do it better."

—Lo Jui-Ching, Minister of Public Security, in report to State Administration Council, August 26, 1954. NCNA, September 7, 1954.

As Some Correctees Picture It:

Prisoners had to attend the "labor brainwashing education" classes given by the "cultural teacher." Once or twice a week a "struggle meeting" was held, at which prisoners were encouraged to confess their sins. . . . New prisoners were deluded into confessing by the apparently spontaneous confessions made by informers and spies among the inmates. . . . The inmates were not taught any technical skills but were simply worked like draught animals.

* * *

The prisoners get up at 5:30 a. m., have their first meal at 9:00 and eat again at 3:00 in the afternoon. Apart from interruptions for meals, they work practically all day—until 8 p. m. From 8 till 9, there is a meeting for self-criticism. . . . A large number of prisoners die every day; the corpses are thrown into the river. . . . Even prisoners who are seriously ill have to work. . . .

* * *

Prisoners were often fetched during the night for questioning. . . . Those who were beaten to death or shot were lucky, because those who survived the beating had to work next day, and no greater torture can be imagined.

—Extracted from depositions of former prisoners, published in United Nations Social and Economic Council Report, Forced Labor, December 15, 1955.

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they publicly discuss its problems. Not only do they boast of its political effectiveness, but they also speak with pride about its economic accomplishments. How significant are these accomplishments? And how justified is the Communists' pride in them?

In March 1951, one year after the establishment of the Chingho Farm, an NCNA report boasted that the "counterrevolutionary criminals" undergoing reform through labor there had performed a stupendous job of land reclamation, irrigation ditch-digging, construction of buildings, farming and animal husbandry, in addition to various kinds of supplementary industrial work.[14] Similarly successful results for corrective labor projects in Central China were also claimed during this early period, and a Hongkong Communist paper in December 1951 published a glowing account of the achievements of forced laborers in the Canton area.[15] Lo Jui-ching, in his report on the 1954 regulations, was still more boastful:

During the past four years, many reformatory labor farms have been set up, some of the larger farms having an area of over 10,000 *mou* (1,600 acres). A number of industrial plants have also been established under this program In addition, numerous labor corps have been organized for public works such as water conservation, railway construction, lumber collection, and house building.

Lo further asserted that "the farms, industrial plants, mines, ceramic works and other production enterprises now in operation have laid a firm foundation for the future work of reforming criminals through labor." More important, he added, they had contributed directly to "the development of national reconstruction" and "resulted in substantial savings for the state, thus creating a large amount of national wealth."

The various corrective labor enterprises must have required a considerable investment. How, then, could they have produced, in the brief span of four years, "a large amount of national wealth?" Lo indirectly answered this question by stating that after deducting the living costs of the prisoners and other necessary expenditures for the program during the four-year period, "the amount of fixed assets and liquid capital thus accumulated is approximately equal to the total sum allocated by the state for this program."

Although somewhat involved, Lo's statement suggests that the output of corrective forced labor was amortizing the investment at such a rapid rate that the total costs could be expected to be balanced out by receipts at the end of the fifth fiscal year (1954). If Lo's claim was not an exaggeration, and assuming that similar conditions continued to prevail, it is possible that forced labor enterprise may actually have produced a considerable surplus in the sixth year (1955).

But what are the human relations under which the Communists achieve such results? Obviously, the criminal forced laborer is in much more unfortunate position than either the manorial serf of feudal days or the conscripted member of a state corvée team, both of whom to some extent enjoyed (or enjoy) a life of their own. The criminal laborer is personally unfree, and even though he may not be serving a life term, the conditions under which he works are essentially those of slavery. Institutionally, corrective labor as practiced in mainland China and other Communist countries is but a modern form of slave labor.

Compared with the private ownership of slaves, Communist state slavery has conspicuous advantages. The bureaucratic masters of the economy do not have to purchase their convict laborers, nor need they pay them any wages. The costs of maintaining and guarding them may be considerable, but the history of chattel slavery shows that it may, if sufficiently organized, produce a surplus even when the slaves are purchased at a high price and the costs of maintenance are substantial. Other conditions being equal, the surplus manifestly is the larger, the less that is spent for upkeep and the longer the slaves are kept toiling. The inhumanity which characterizes the Chinese Communists' treatment of criminal laborers shows that they are fully aware of the methods which make slave labor economically profitable.

The System in Operation

ALTHOUGH the Peiping regime systematized its corrective labor policies at a time when the USSR and the East European satellites were evidently beginning to handle their own forced laborers less wastefully, it significantly showed little readiness to ease the harsh practices that had grown up in the early years of Communist rule.

The 1954 regulations, drawn up with Soviet advice, did incorporate certain features of the "rationalized" Soviet forced labor policy, such as provision for better sanitation and for "supply centers" where prisoners may buy "supplementary food."[16] They failed, however, to provide for any significant improvement of existing living and working conditions; nor did they provide for wages. Indeed, earlier experiments with small payments were discontinued. Corrective

[14] NCNA, March 18, 1951 (UNESC, p. 108). Cf. NCNA, October 18, 1951 (UNESC, p. 226 ff.).

[15] Hongkong, *Wen-wei Pao*, December 15, 1951.

[16] Regulations, Articles 51, 53.

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labor, said a *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) editorial on the regulations, is "compulsory and without remuneration." [17]

There was, of course, a practical reason for the Soviet tendency, by 1950, to ameliorate forced labor conditions, just as there was a practical reason for the Chinese Communist failure to follow suit. The USSR and East European countries had to husband their human resources because of a shrinkage in the annual labor force increment resulting from the war.[18] The Chinese Communists could draw on an almost inexhaustible labor supply and consequently saw no need to introduce costly improvements in the corrective labor system.

Work hours for Chinese forced labor are long. The 1954 regulations (Article 52) prescribe that the labor day shall be, "as a rule," 9–10 hours and "in seasonal production . . . up to 12 hours." The catch lies in the words "as a rule." If they mean anything, they mean that the overseers are free to prolong working hours as they see fit.

Discipline is harsh. The corrective labor force is organized in divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and platoons. According to the testimony of former prisoners, details are "marched to work under strict discipline," and beatings are invariably administered for infractions of the rules both during and outside working hours. At the "East China Farm" near Shanghai, the laborers were "simply worked like draught animals . . . each plough was drawn by four to six men, and laggards were whipped." [19]

Article 46 of the 1954 regulations mentions "instruments of restraint" which the guards may be authorized to use "as precaution against possible escape, violence, or other dangerous acts on the part of a prisoner." This manifestly refers to iron chains and cuffs, which are freely employed in the prisons and camps of Mao's China. In addition, the Communists enforce a system known as "mutual guarantee and mutual punishment" under which one prisoner's attempt to escape brings punishment upon all members of his unit or work detail.[20] Knowledge that his fellows will suffer for his offense is a powerful deterrent to the individual prisoner contemplating escape.

A Communist account describing how forced laborers at the Chingho Farm established a ditch-digging record while working barefooted on ice remarked that "obviously these results could by no means be achieved by compulsion alone." [21] Indeed, there are other incentives the nature of which becomes readily apparent when we look at the situation of the three main categories of prisoners composing the corrective labor force.

As already noted, the preponderant middle group, composed of prisoners serving terms of more than two years but less than life, work in reformatory labor corps camps. Competitions are held to stimulate production, with prizes for the winners; special awards or privileges may be won by "voluntarily" asking for longer work hours. If a prisoner consistently observes labor discipline and fulfills or exceeds the production norm, he has a chance to earn a "material award" or, possibly, a reduction of his sentence.[22]

The same incentives evidently operate for the other two principal groups: untried prisoners and prisoners sentenced to less than two years, who are held in houses of detention; and prisoners under life sentence or given a stay of death sentence, who perform hard labor in prison. In each of these groups, however, the usual incentives are combined with others far more compelling.

In the houses of detention, the prisoners awaiting trial naturally toil unsparingly at their work assignments in the hope of winning acquittal or getting off with a light sentence. Their already convicted fellows are obliged to match their performance in order to avoid punishment as shirkers or saboteurs. In the prisons, it is those under suspended death sentence who set the pace, which the "lifers" perforce must try to equal. Thus, prisoners awaiting trial work for their freedom; those given a stay of execution work for their lives. The rest must keep up to avoid a harsher fate than is already theirs.

British trade union leader H. Earnshaw, a member of the Labor Party delegation which visited China in August 1954, is one of the few independent foreigners allowed to see how this type of incentive operates. At a Peiping prison, he was told that prisoners under

[17] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, September 7, 1954.

[18] Bertram D. Wolfe, "Stalinism Versus Stalin: Exorcising a Stubborn Ghost," *Commentary*, June 1956, p. 529 ff.

[19] Summaries of reports and depositions by ex-prisoners: Cheng Chu-yuan, *Chung-kung ti nu-kung chih-tu* (The Slave System of the Chinese Communists), Freedom Press, Hongkong, 1952 (hereafter cited as Cheng 1952), pp. 75 ff., 83; P'ei Yu-ming, *Wo lai tzu tung-pei nu-kung-ying* (I Came from the Northeast Slave Camp), Asiatic Press, Hongkong, 1954 (hereafter cited as P'ei 1954), pp. 48, 89 ff., 148 ff.; Teng Jen-chuan, *Chung-kung tsen-yang tsui-t'ai ch'an-fu* (How Did the Chinese Communists Treat Prisoners of War?), Freedom Press, Hongkong, 1952 (hereafter cited as Teng 1952), p. 15 and *passim*. Cf. UNESC, pp. 60–68, 258–66, *passim*.

[20] UNESC, pp. 258, 263, 267.

[21] NCNA report, October 18, 1951, cited in UNESC, p. 229.

[22] Regulations, Article 68.

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suspended death sentence could "redeem themselves through labor" but would be "executed . . . if their work did not give satisfaction." Earnshaw was stunned at seeing all the prisoners "working at full stretch" in what was, for some, nothing less than a desperate marathon against death. "In fact," he noted, "we had never seen human beings working at such a pace." [23]

The corrective labor force also includes women, both old and young, sometimes as many as 1,500 in a single camp. Some have been convicted for their own "criminal" offenses, but others merely because—as one ex-prisoner stated—they were "relatives" of those whom the Communists describe as "reactionary elements." [24] Apart from provisions against imprisonment of pregnant women, for separate women's quarters, and for supervision of women prisoners by female personnel, the 1954 regulations fail to stipulate any differentiation in treatment in regard to work hours or rest days.[25]

Silence is a concomitant of labor. Many former inmates of prisons and corrective labor camps testify that talk between prisoners was forbidden during working hours and often at other times as well.[26] To the rule of silence, however, there is one exception: the prisoners are obliged to attend "study groups" for an average of at least an hour per day.[27] Weakened by exhausting day-long labor, poor food, and inadequate shelter, they still must learn Communist doctrine. But first they must "struggle" against themselves. In unending "criticism and self-criticism" they belabor each other and condemn their own earlier thoughts and actions, until all positions displeasing to their Communist masters are rejected.

Political Effect and Perspectives

THUS, corrective labor serves the Mao regime both as a means of economic exploitation and a weapon for political coercion, intimidation and re-education. To measure its general political effect, it is important to arrive at some approximation of the numbers of Chinese who have been subjected to it, and particularly of those who have survived and returned home, "reconstructed" to Communist specifications.

A report presented by the Chinese delegation to the United Nations in February 1955 estimated the number of persons who had done slave labor in Mao's China at 25 million.[28] This figure included "civilians committed to forced [corvée] labor" (8 million) and "victims of disasters used as slave laborers" (3 million). Marx' conception of corvée-based Oriental despotism as a society of "general slavery" would justify classing these two groups as slave laborers, but here we shall deal only with slave laborers in the narrow sense. This leaves 14 million persons sentenced to slave labor in Communist China through 1954.

Earlier estimates put the figure at 20 million for the period up to mid-1952, 15 million for the period from 1950–53, and 23.25 million up to February 1954—this last estimate relying on Nationalist Chinese sources. The well-known Chinese-American author, Yuan-Li Wu, in his recent book, *An Economic Survey of Communist China*, sees these various figures as "guesses based on incomplete returns," but definitely indicative of the staggering number of persons involved.[29] In any case, 14 million is a more conservative estimate than any of the others cited, considering the longer period covered. It is based on elaborate calculations using available bits of information to determine the size of the various groups which make up the slave labor force. While the estimates for some groups could possibly be too high, errors in the opposite direction are by no means excluded.

To bring the total figure up to date, a substantial number must be added on account of the peasant "counterrevolutionaries" penalized during the tremendously stepped-up collectivization drive of 1955 and the first half of 1956. Again, there are no official over-all figures, but Communist publications admit that the new wave of "counterrevolutionary" resistance and sabotage was widespread. It is an entirely reasonable guess that the recent additions not only compensate for any possible exaggeration in the 14 million estimate, but raise the total by at least one million. Therefore, we can say that in six years of Chinese Communist rule about 15 million persons out of a total population of around 600 million—one out of every 40 citizens—have entered the regime's prisons or corrective labor camps.

Not all who enter are fortunate enough to leave. There is ample evidence that the death rate in the prisons and camps is high, though how high is hard to guess. Food rations are probably less inadequate in the camps than in the prisons, but the strenuousness of the outdoor labor and frequent exposure of the

[23] UNESC, pp. 264–5.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 261.
[25] Regulations, Articles 37–39 and 52.
[26] P'ei 1954, p. 123; UNESC, p. 260.
[27] Regulations, Articles 26, 52.
[28] UNESC, p. 95.
[29] Yuan-li Wu, *An Economic Survey of Communist China*, Bookman Associates, New York, 1956, p. 322 ff.

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prisoners to the bitterest kind of weather are counterbalancing factors.[30] According to the testimony of many former camp inmates, the less hardy, weakened by overwork, lack of rest, and malnutrition, contract illnesses which often prove fatal because of neglect. In not a few instances prisoners taking part in production "competitions" died from over-exertion.[31]

Still, a significant number of prisoners evidently manage to survive long enough to be discharged. Once more general statistics are lacking, and what fragmentary information has been given out by Communist sources must be treated with reserve. A statement by the director of the Chingho Farm in April 1955 claimed that "more than two-thirds of all criminals [sent there] were released . . . on or even before the expiration of their original prison terms." [32]

Not all those nominally released, however, are free to go where they please. Article 62 of the 1954 regulations stipulates that corrective labor institutions shall re-enregister not only any prisoners who "elect to remain" but also those who are "homeless [and] without any prospect of employment" or who have been confined "in sparsely populated areas, where their settlement is possible." There are thus two categories of prisoners who are obliged to stay whether they like it or not, even if their status is no longer that of regular convicts. As for "volunteers", it is doubtful that there are many whose decision is not the result of pressure by the labor camp authorities and/or fear of not being welcome in their home localities.

According to Minister Lo's 1954 report, 27 percent of all prisoners released from Chingho Farm up to that time had "voluntarily" stayed to work in or near the camp.[33] Lacking independent information, we are obliged to accept this as a fair approximation of the total percentage who remained, whether voluntarily or otherwise.

Nevertheless, the majority of prisoners who survive and win release evidently return to their villages or towns, adjusting as best they can and taking due care not to discuss the acts of violence and inhumanity which they have experienced. Even though they remain silent, the effects of what they have been through are readily apparent. Assuming that by mid-1956 roughly half of the estimated total of 15 million prisoners have returned home, one out of every 80 Chinese is a living, fear-inspiring reminder to those around him of the regime's punitive power.

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AN editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* on April 1, 1955, classed both corrective labor farms and state farms operated with military labor as "socialist enterprises." These units are large, mechanized, and run by an authoritarian management which fixes production quotas with no concessions to "small-peasant thought." In the Communist view, they are more advanced than the "semi-socialist" agricultural producers' cooperatives, which still tolerate some survivals of private property and freedom.

But the existence side-by-side of "socialist" and "semi-socialist" enterprise will not continue indefinitely. While leaving the details of future development open, the *Jen-min Jih-pao*-editorial stated that the state farms "should absorb into them the experienced farmers of the locality." When this becomes the dominant trend, the "socialist" farms with their military or coercive labor set-up will eventually absorb the less "socialist" agricultural units.

What about industry? In the large state-operated industrial enterprises, labor is not as thoroughly disciplined as on the state and corrective labor farms. But this situation is rapidly changing. *Kung-jen Jih-pao* (Workers' Daily), as early as January 21,1955, reported that "punishment of workers has become the principal method of consolidating labor discipline, and the 'Outline of Labor Regulations in State-Owned Enterprises' has been made the legal basis for punishing the workers."

These regulations, in fact, give the managers almost unlimited authority to punish infractions of labor discipline. Under their whip, the workers are confused and often desperate to the point of accusing themselves of crimes they did not commit. They cry and are "scared to death." [34] The regime inveighs against excesses on the part of the managers. But it is careful not to deprive them of the punitive power which is imposing upon even the ordinary worker more and more of the harsh discipline and ill-treat-

[30] Though better than in the prisons, food rations in the camps are stated by ex-prisoners to have been extremely inadequate. One testified that the daily ration at a Shanghai area camp consisted of "one catty [about 1⅓ lb.] of rice, one gram of oil, one gram of salt, half a catty of fuel and two ounces of vegetables." Another stated that the prisoners at a camp in Shantung Province received two meals a day, each consisting of two 5-ounce loaves made of sorghum flour and cottonseed, without any vegetables. UNESC, pp. 257, 260.

[31] Su Wei-ch'uan, *Shen-pei nu-kung-ying* (The Slave Camps in Northern Shensi), Asiatic Press, Hongkong, 1954, pp. 123-28; Cheng 1954, p. 83; P'ei 1954, p. 89; UNESC, p. 259.

[32] NCNA, April 13, 1955.

[33] Lo 1954, see UNESC, p. 194.

[34] *Kung-jen Jih-pao*, January 21, 1955.

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ment which are the lot of the criminal forced laborer.

To be sure, as long as man retains some inner autonomy, there are bound to be "counterrevolutionaries" who will be sent to special punitive and corrective institutions. These institutions therefore appear firmly entrenched in the Communist system. But when the disciplinary and corrective functions thus far performed most consistently by the corrective labor administration become part of all state enterprises, then there will be little to distinguish the supposedly free, non-criminal laborer from his counterpart in forced labor camps.

Utopias and Realities

Sidney Hook: *Marx and the Marxists*,
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
New York, 1955, 254 pp.
Daniel Norman:
Marx and Soviet Reality,
The Batchworth Press, London, 1955, 72 pp.

Reviewed by Ben B. Seligman

WHEN Karl Marx, in his later years, was apprised of some of the ideas being bruited about in his name, he remarked with feeling, "I am not a Marxist!" The two paper-back volumes under review derive their justification from this denial. The larger of the two, that by Professor Hook, whose long-standing concern with the impact of leftist ideology is well-known, suggests that the confusion over "Marxism" occurred because of the inherent ambiguity in his philosophy. It was thus not impossible for both Democratic Socialists and rabid totalitarians of the Stalinist stripe to seek inspiration in the pages of *Das Kapital*. Mr. Norman, a Rumanian now following a journalist's career in England, is much more explicit; in his view, and he makes an excellent case for it, the relationship of Soviet reality to Marxian philosophy and doctrine is an illogical sequent that only those with a penchant for the political myth would believe. Unfortunately, there are quite a few who do accept such myths.

Professor Hook's book has the added virtue of offering some twenty-odd readings from the stalwarts in the history of scientific socialism: there are abstracts from the *Communist Manifesto*, the *Critique of Political Economy* and *Das Kapital;* from Trotsky's defense of orthodoxy against the Revisionist onslaught; from Plekhanov, De Leon, Bernstein, and Juarès; and some really striking quotations from Lenin that go far toward revealing the Bonapartist character of the Bolshevik mentality.

Norman and Hook agree on one point, and that is the essentially humanist basis of Marx's own thinking—an attribute that was to be twisted and distorted beyond all recognition by the cynicism of the self-appointed heirs of Marx. As Hook makes evident, Marx's own temperament was such that he recognized the worth of the individual personality; this instinct makes itself felt in his work and sharply distinguishes him from the totalitarians who so glibly invoke his name. Contrary to general notions, he did not visualize his political program as the instrument of a conspiratorial clique seeking to impose an oppressive dictatorship in order to exercise power for its own sake. A true Marxist party, in his view, would be primarily an educational organization. But with this view, the author suggests, Marx would have been an early candidate for Moscow's Lubianka prison.

The major difficulty with the Marxist system of thought, according to Hook, is its lack of clarity: it was this that made it so easy for Stalin to adopt any ideological interpretation required to rationalize Soviet acts. There was a confusion in Marxism of ultimate and proximate causes, and in its search for total solutions, it became philosophically unintelligible.

The equivocal nature of Marx's doctrine was underscored by the multiplicity of interpretations that were developed after his death. While continuing to

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stress the economic factor in history, Karl Kautsky, German social democracy's famed theoretician, began to develop what seemed to others to be serious deviations in doctrine. Yet it was Kautsky who first identified a certain type of middle class intellectual as the progenitor of the professional revolutionary. George Plekhanov, the founder of Russian Marxism, continued to unfold the meaning of scientific socialism as the impingement of inexorable social forces on the life of the individual. Yet contrary to his successors, he insisted on the requirement of a fully developed capitalist order as a precondition for socialism in Russia. Had he lived he, too, would have wound up in Lubianka.

Those for whom Hook has the greatest regard and greatest affinity are Eduard Bernstein and Jean Juarès. Both of these men were humanists first and doctrinal socialists second. Bernstein had urged that there was a growing cleavage between social democratic theory and practice, and he was honest enough to insist that doctrinal beliefs should conform to political and economic reality. The Marxian apocalypse meant nothing to him, for it had no bearing, he said, on the immediate, pragmatic considerations of everyday living. The amorphous chimera of the classless society could be displaced only by better housing, higher living standards, more education and a growing self-respect among the working class. It was the latter factors, he insisted, that were primary: thus he spelled out some of the economic components of democracy as essential elements in the fabric of a socialist state. Class interests were made subservient to community interests.

Jean Juarès was in many ways one of the most attractive figures in European socialism, and Professor Hook's brief account of his ideas does him complete justice. Juarès, whose views were a compendium of undogmatic expressions of socialist idealism, felt passionately that principles were paramount. The law of human rights, he urged, should assure to all men freedom to grow and to achieve personal fulfillment. This meant, in its practical application, a sharing of political and economic responsibility: only this is democracy in the fullest sense of the word. He was opposed to violence: conciliation, intelligence, education and the humanist approach could help reduce the seemingly omnipresent imperfections of man, insisted Juarès.

Then came Leninism and Stalinism. For the first time the world had to face up to an unparalleled political shrewdness and firm purpose, coupled with a flexibility of movement that was as deceptive as it was unscrupulous. The only principle the Bolsheviks revered was the use of tactical expediency in the service of power. This fact was often obscured by an ideological facade which was itself a product of momentary needs. Whenever they were in a minority in the early days, the Bolsheviks cried for democracy. After Lenin had seized the party's controls, he demanded unity as a means of retaining his hold. Once state power had been won, he moved inexorably on to dictatorship, all the while seeking to justify the tightening of the screws by professions of military and economic weakness. Later Stalin was to add capitalist encirclement and Fascist attack as a justification for terror.

All this is summarized by Professor Hook with remarkable skill in a limited amount of space. As might be expected, he does lean toward some explication of the philosophical undertones. He demonstrates that although Lenin considered ideas to be mere images, his own notions of social reality were translated into plans for action which were often frightening in their audacity. "Party truths" or "class truths" are shown to be constructs which justify and re-enforce the kind of subjection by terror characteristic of totalitarian societies. By such ideological rationalization, physical terror is transformed into mass psychological terror: the last semblance of human dignity is erased, and man is reduced with ease to a mere cipher. All crimes committed in the name of the "party" are forgiven in the name of "historical necessity."

It was this denouement that led Daniel Norman to examine Soviet reality in the light of Marx's words. If we accept his definitions of the latter—and it is entirely possible to do so—then his thesis that there is no correspondence between Marxism and Sovietism makes substantial sense. The term "exploitation" is a case in point: Soviet Communists claim that "exploitation" has been abolished in the USSR, while still evident in the West. Yet one finds that the British worker is still able to fight for an improvement in his status and even to have a hand in the business of government, while his Soviet counterpart, who supposedly no longer suffers exploitation, ". . . earns less, works longer hours, has much less variety of goods on which to spend his money, has trade unions which exist only to squeeze more and more work out of him . . . and has the prospect of being sent to a forced labor camp if he makes a mistake or protests his lot. . . ."

The fact is, says Mr. Norman, that the Russia made in Stalin's image has little, if anything, to do with

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the Marxian dream. Marx and his compatriot Engels envisaged a society in which material, ethical and psychological alienation would disappear. Communism, they thought, would be identified with perfect naturalism and equated to humanism. That there is not the slightest relationship between this utopian conception and Soviet fact is patent. Indeed, in no society has there been greater disharmony between human and state-imposed values than in Soviet Russia (and today, one may add in China and Eastern Europe).

Nevertheless this utopian ideal has been used as the basis for a cruel and fantastic process of "capital accumulation" in Soviet Russia. Interestingly enough, says Mr. Norman, it was Engels who foresaw what would happen. In a letter of 1893, he remarked that industrialization in Russia would be far more violent and accompanied by much greater suffering than elsewhere. Nor did Engels (or Marx) envisage a successful socialist society in Russia without its development first in other countries. If modern industry were to be grafted onto Russia's primitive countryside without anything being done to counteract the heritage of intellectual isolation, then, warned Engels, only the most peculiar and extravagant forms of despotism could result. The truth of this prediction is vouchsafed by the actuality of modern Russia.

The kinship which exists between Tsarist and Soviet autocracy is clear in foreign policy, says Mr. Norman: Stalinist expansion matches the Tsarist push eastward across the Asian land mass. The seizure of the Baltic states parallels the annexation of the Crimea. The division of Poland in 1939 can be equated to the taking of Bessarabia decades earlier. Engels' opinion on Russian foreign policy, quoted by Mr. Norman as a concluding idea of his pamphlet, is an apt one:

The danger of a general war will disappear on the day when a change of things in Russia will allow the Russian people to blot out, at a stroke, the traditional policy of its Tsars, and to turn its attention to its own internal vital interests, now seriously menaced, instead of bringing about universal supremacy.

Long Journey Home

Wolfgang Leonhard:
Die Revolution Entlässt ihre Kinder
(The Revolution Disowns its Children)
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln-Berlin, 1955, 558 pp.

Reviewed by Marianne Pollak

MR. Leonhard's book comes as an invaluable commentary at a time when Communists all over the world are facing the difficult readjustment to the obliteration of the Stalin cult. For here is a first-hand revelation of the anguishing mental gymnastics forced on even the most faithful by periodic changes, inconsistencies and opportunism in the Communist Party line. The author, a German raised from early childhood as a Communist, spent a decade in the USSR getting as close a view of the Soviet colossus as perhaps any foreigner could. His account offers enlightening insight into the workings of Soviet society and, more important, into the mental conditioning and attitudes of dedicated Communists.

Leonhard, in company with his mother, crossed the Soviet frontier in the summer of 1935 as a political refugee from Hitlerite Germany. Already imbued with a Marxist outlook, the 13-year-old boy was ready material for Soviet indoctrination in a "Youth Home", a special school for refugee children. With the idealism and enthusiasm of youth, he accepted what he was taught as truth: that service to the revolution meant service to the Soviet state, that here was the true mission in life for the believer.

Leonhard's dedication to Stalinist communism was to last 15 years. Yet gradually, almost imperceptibly, a series of events and impressions were to make an erosive dent in his faith. The sudden and unexplained arrest of his mother early in the "Great Purge"

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of 1936–38 seems, surprisingly, to have caused him little concern. But the wholesale liquidation of Lenin's old guard, following upon their debasing self-accusations of treachery, appears to have started the first gnawings of doubt in his mind. He also witnessed personally the arrest of teachers who had been idols of the school children, and stood by while a boy in his dormitory was taken off by the secret police. The youth gave some thought to what these victims would suffer and groped to understand the meaning of the purge. But to ask questions would have been a capital sin against discipline: involuntarily his doubts were pushed back into subconsciousness.

By 1939 Leonhard had moved on to a higher school, joined the Communist Youth League and thrown himself enthusiastically into the life of a young Soviet patriot. Then came the sudden announcement of the cynical Stalin-Hitler Pact, inflicting the first real wound upon the faith of a boy who had had to flee Nazism. Scarcely had he adjusted to the party dictates implementing the pact than Hitler turned around and attacked the USSR. All German and Austrian refugees became "suspect" and were deported to the East.

Leonhard describes in detail the brutalities of this enforced "resettlement". The deportees spent 22 days in overcrowded wagons, with little food or rest. They travelled through desolate territory where the people lived more like animals than human beings. Yet, despite personal hardships and disappointment, Leonhard's loyalty in this period was still stronger than his judgment.

Perhaps the most decisive influence in the author's development was his admittance to a comintern school at Ufa in 1943. For the first time in many months he was free of worries about food and a roof over his head. But in other respects he became a prisoner: "I came to recognize that the life of a party officer . . . meant constant control from outside and from within oneself, compared with which my previous existence as a [party] rank-and-filer seemed almost free."

The school—a Communist version of the Nazis' "Ordensburg" training schools—was closely guarded from the outside community. Although never specifically told so, the students knew they were being trained for illegal political work abroad. Divided into national groups, they were given intensive instruction on political subjects and an intimate knowledge of the "target" country. Leonhard does not state how many such groups existed, but mentions his own German group, a Spanish group, and contingents from several of the present-day satellites.

An air of mystery and secrecy permeated every aspect of life at the school. All students were given pseudonyms and ordered not to reveal their real identities. If a student met a former acquaintance or friend, he could not betray recognition. Emphasis was laid on strict discipline and total submission to the party viewpoint. The school was in effect a drill-ground for training students in the correct political responses to every party order: classroom discussion was kept within well-defined limits, and students were careful not to get too close to border areas. Leonhard comments on this chapter of his life: "Within eleven months they had managed to transform me from a gay, open-minded student and Komsomol into a party officer who weighed every word he said."

As the war drew to a close, it appeared that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were laying the groundwork for a common postwar policy. This, says Leonhard, was as much the hope of the Soviet people as of the rest of the world. How grossly they were deceived has long since been proven by evidence of Stalin's unprecedented wartime preparations for the later conquest of East Europe and Germany from within.

Leonhard was assigned to "Group Ulbricht" and in April 1945, just a week before the close of hostilities, flew westward to Germany with nine others. He was then 23 years old. What he witnessed in the following four years led to his final break with Stalinism. The expedient exploitation of sincere Communists for Soviet ends, the abuse of individuals, the evidence that the Stalin regime intended to keep East Germany a vassal state within the Soviet empire and thus would never permit the development of a "German path to socialism"—all these factors brought Leonhard's latent doubts to the surface. What disillusioned him most was the complete subservience of the German Communist leaders to Moscow; he came to realize that they were simply executive tools for carrying out orders from the Kremlin. At all levels of administration, commands had to be carried out to the letter without questioning; any initiative from below was relentlessly stamped out.

Equally disillusioning to the author was the sight of the Communist leaders living in abundance in luxurious villas formerly occupied by Nazi officials, while the leaders in West Berlin shared the hardships of the average citizen.

Leonhard read many things, listened to broadcasts, spoke to people on the street. But the arguments of

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Western propaganda were wasted on him and on those like him: "We were opponents of Stalinism but we were not prepared to put in its place the old capitalist conditions."

Three books, however, made a deep impression on him: *Trade Unions and Social Security in the Soviet Union*, by Solomon Schwarz, a Menshevik who had emigrated to the United States; Arthur Koestler's *The Yogi and the Commissar;* and *On the Other Side of Capitalism* by Paul Sering, a German Socialist. Readers acquainted with these studies will understand why they succeeded in penetrating the fertile soil of a potential defector's mind. Hate-songs would have repelled him. But documented figures, unshakeable facts, pointed arguments and comparisons were stimuli to independent thinking.

Leonhard's moment of decision came when the Yugoslav Communists dared the unbelievable—when Tito embarked on a path independent of the Kremlin and thereby shattered the illusion of Soviet omnipotence. With the way pointed out, he was able to draw a dividing line between his own socialist orientation and blind loyalty to Stalinist communism. In a daring escape he slipped out of East Berlin in March 1949 and eleven days later arrived in Belgrade. After a sojourn in the country of the "renegades" he eventually made his way to West Germany.

Perhaps the most important lesson of Leonhard's book, implicit in his own experience, is this: genuine believers in communism do not betray their convictions because of private misfortunes or reverses, however painful they may be. Their faith breaks down only when they come to see the inherent weakness or willful disregard of doctrinal tenets which they had been taught were infallible. The arrest of Leonhard's mother and her subsequent imprisonment for twelve years, his own forced deportation and its attendant hardships, the tragedies which befell others he knew as a result of one or another regime policy—such experiences were bound to have a cumulative effect upon him, but in every case he managed to convince himself that circumstance, not the system, was responsible.

What led to his disillusionment and ultimate defection was rather the Stalin regime's repeated betrayal of the ideals it claimed to stand for, its cynical manipulation of doctrine to suit the purposes of Soviet expansionism, and finally Yugoslavia's daring assertion of independence, epitomizing the break that Leonhard himself was ready to make.

In this lesson lies a basis for hope that the Communist system will eventually prove its own undoing. Today the world watches the new rulers in Moscow scrapping the statues of the former god-omnipotent. It listens to the renunciation of his once infallible commandments. Surely some of the Communist faithful have been shaken by the demand for this drastic reorientation of their loyalties. Surely some must see that the dictates of today can be reversed just as drastically tomorrow. At least a few must feel—as did Leonhard before them—a little less sure of the foundations of their faith.

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Recent Studies on Communist Affairs

SWITZERLAND

Writers' Congress in East Berlin, by Theodor Wieser, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, Zurich, March 1956.

Wherever communism rules, literature and those who produce it have faced a seemingly insoluble dilemma: how to square the dictates of political orthodoxy, as defined by the party in the principles of "socialist realism," with good writing and artistic creativity. East Germany is no exception, as Mr. Wieser shows in his report on the Writers' Congress held in East Berlin last January.

Wilhelm Girnus, a leading advocate of party orthodoxy, stated bluntly in a pre-Congress pronouncement that "ideological clarity," *i.e.*, strictest adherence to the party line in literature, was inextricably related to "artistic mastership." Without such clarity, according to Girnus and his circle, there could be no artistry in literature.

This line of reasoning aroused some controversy at the Congress. Taking a more "liberal" approach, the well known German Communist writer, Anna Seghers, pointed out that artistic creativity need not merely "illustrate" party ideas, but could actually lead the party to discover new phenomena in reality.

Aside from ideological dissensions, the Congress clearly revealed the poor state of literature in East Germany. None of the famous old-timers like Anna Seghers, Arnold Zweig or Bertold Brecht had produced anything of major impact, and the work of lesser writers was characterized by the Secretary of the Writers' Association as "lacking imagination," "platitudinous," and "lacking a personal point of view."

The most important event of the Congress took place on the last day when Walter Ulbricht, Communist Party Secretary and leading official of the East German regime, addressed the assembly. "Socialist development," he declared, was to be the foremost theme of East German literature:

To recognize this new thing, this progress, to give artistic expression to the struggle between reaction and the new life . . . that is the most important task of our literature.

In short, after the plea for greater artistic independence by the opponents of the Girnus group, the party again intervened and laid down the law. The task of East German writers was to be of service to the party's needs of the moment. Anything else, Ulbricht's address showed, would be considered a deviation from socialist "truth and reality."

INDIA

Stalin—Perverter of Leninism?, by a Student of Soviet Affairs, *Thought*, New Delhi, March 24, March 31, and April 14, 1956.

As his title indicates, the author of this series of articles tackles a question which is of interest not only from the theoretical and academic standpoint but also from the standpoint of appraising practical future possibilities. If, indeed, Stalin grossly perverted Lenin's teachings as the present Soviet leadership claims, the "rehabilitators" of pristine Leninism—Khrushchev *et al.*—might logically be expected to carry out some fundamental changes affecting the character and purposes of the Communist Party. If, on the other hand, Stalinism involved no basic departure from Leninism, then the "new look" in Communist ideology can hardly produce any sweeping change and probably must be considered a mere tactical maneuver of transitory character.

The author makes a case for the latter point of view. He recalls that Lenin himself junked volumes of Marx' theoretical writings when he insisted upon a "revolutionary elite," established a monolithic party organization, and smashed even fellow socialist parties after the successful Bolshevik revolution. Once embarked upon, it was merely a matter of time and of tactical expediency before this road led the USSR to the Stalinist stage of absolutism in which the whim of one man ruled the Communist Party and, through it, the state. Stalin, declares the author, did not change the Leninist scheme; he merely perfected it to the point where even the last remaining equalitarian goals of the October Revolution were sacrificed to the drive of the ruling caste to assure its self-perpetuation. Despite the repudiation of Stalinism, the author sees no reason to believe that this drive has ceased or will cease to be the prime moving force behind the Soviet system.

The author attributes Stalin's success in wielding such awesome power to his ability to manipulate the subordinate *loci* of power—the army, the secret police, the party and the bureaucracy—playing one against another in a perpetual rivalry for influence and authority around his own person. The fact that this process

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seems to have been interrupted by Stalin's death, he believes, does not signify any basic change in the system, but only a temporary weakening of it. "Collective leadership" was the only answer in a situation where no single person wielded sufficient influence to rally the various power *loci* entirely around himself. However, concludes the author, the absolutist principle inherent in the concept of permanent revolution remains, and as long as it persists, a tendency to drift back to one-man rule is inevitable.

JAPAN

A Muslim Visits Communist China, a series of articles by Asa Bafagih, in *The Green Flag* (Tokyo), February and April 1956 issues.

Probably one of the best kept secrets of Communist China is the fate of its large Muslim population. Despite their number, estimated by some at as many as 50 million, the outside world knows little of how they are faring under the Communist regime, and what scant information is doled out from the Peiping propaganda mill is neither very revealing nor reliable.

Mr. Bafagih, an Indonesian newspaper editor who visited Communist China as a member of the Indonesian delegation to the fifth anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic in October 1954, made a special effort to penetrate this mystery during his visit. His account, appearing serially in an English-language Muslim journal in Tokyo, is interesting not because he succeeded in doing so, but because of the obstructions and frustrations he encountered in his inquiry—which reinforces the widely-held suspicion that here is another unsavory skeleton in the Chinese Communist closet.

Mr. Bafagih reports that he and his Indonesian colleagues were prevented at every step from making fruitful contacts with Chinese Muslims. Though the delegation stayed in the Chinese Communist capital for two weeks, a requested interview with Professor Muhammed Makien, a famous Chinese Muslim scholar at Peiping University, was never granted—first on the ground that the professor was too busy and later that he had suddenly become too ill to see anybody! The delegation had no better luck with its request for permission to visit Sinkiang Province, where the Muslims are in a majority. This time the grounds of refusal were that Sinkiang was too far away and that arrangements could not be made on such short notice.

What few interviews the Indonesian delegates did have, with official sanctions, were hardly conducive to frank talking by those interviewed. Mr. Bafagih reports that some Muslim leaders whom they met seemed pleased at first to converse directly in Arabic, but then quickly caught themselves and switched to Chinese, which meant talking through the accompanying official interpreter.

The author also was allowed to visit some functioning mosques in Peiping and Canton, but nowhere was he able to gather much authoritative information concerning the life of the Muslim communities. What distressed him most was an estimate he was given, which placed the present number of Muslims in all of Communist China at only about ten million, a mere fraction of the number known to have lived in China before the advent of Communist rule. No one could or would explain why the estimate was so low, a fact underlined by the general increase in the Chinese population.

The only logical explanation, Mr. Bafagih fears, is that millions of Chinese Muslims either fell victim to the Mao regime's campaign of anti-religious persecution or sought safety from it by denying their faith. His sad concluding comment is:

It is probable that many millions of Muslims who have disappeared have merged into the great mass of the people, all wearing uniforms of blue or black. L. L.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

Soviet Political Strategy in Asia, by A. B. C., in *The World Today*, Vol. 12, No. 5, May 1956.

The Soviet Bloc and Under-Developed Countries: An Assessment of Trade and Aid, by A. Z., in *The World Today*, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 1956.

Post-Stalin foreign policy and the means used to implement it are the subjects of two thoughtful articles in recent issues of *The World Today*. The first article, "Soviet Political Strategy in Asia," points out that recent Soviet foreign policy, while restricting itself in Europe to holding or neutralizing operations, has concentrated on infiltrating the economically backward areas of Africa, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and South America. The author feels, however, that this new geographic emphasis in Soviet foreign policy indicates no change in the broader postwar drive to place Germany and Japan firmly in the Soviet sphere of influence, but on the contrary is designed to further it. The present leaders of the Soviet Union have merely adopted the old geopolitical axiom that "the road to Berlin runs through Cairo." By the same token, implies the author, the road to Tokyo runs through Southeast Asia.

Within the past year several major statements by Soviet leaders have emphasized the current strategy. The struggle between capitalism and socialism cannot be settled by war, said Premier Bulganin. "We are convinced the opposite is the case. . . . Let every-

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one prove in peaceful economic competition that he is right." Speaking on the anniversary of the October Revolution, Deputy Premier Kaganovich proposed the creation of what he called a new "socialist internationalism," to be cemented by a far-reaching program of aid to the underdeveloped countries. At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February of this year Mr. Khrushchev made the strategy official. He indicated also that Soviet efforts would be concentrated in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

That the Communist bloc of nations commands sufficient power to sustain a program of aid cannot be denied. The real question is whether or not the Communist bloc sincerely intends to live up to its promise of "economic cooperation." The author of the second article under review shows quite convincingly that this is doubtful.

According to the Soviet definition, "true" economic aid is achieved only when there is "comprehensive expansion of normal economic links based on mutual benefit and equality." The Soviet Union, therefore, bestows only a few gifts and grants and openly prefers trade to outright sales or purchases. In point of fact, however, trade between the Soviet bloc and the underdeveloped areas has been neither extensive nor motivated by the principles of "mutual benefit and equality." In 1955, the *total* volume of Soviet bloc trade—*of exports plus imports*—was only about $530 million. But the most remarkable feature of this trade is that the underdeveloped areas are the credit givers! Indeed, in 1954–55, Argentina had to curtail trade with the Soviet Union because it had accumulated a $40 million credit balance, and at the end of 1954 the USSR chose to settle the balance due Uruguay in sterling, not in commodities as arranged.

In the rare cases when the Soviet Union does sell its products for cash, the sales generally occur at a time of such extreme hardship for the buyer that the use of the term "economic aid" is at least partially apt—as, for example, in the case of the Soviet sales of grain to India and Pakistan in 1951–52. But propaganda rather than aid is the primary Soviet purpose.

For this reason the most favored method of Soviet aid is the provision of a complete project or of technical instruction; and by concentrating its aid on grandiose schemes the Communist bloc has been able to gain propaganda successes quite out of proportion to its efforts. The Bhilai steel mill is a joint Soviet-Indian project and is not scheduled to begin operation until 1959; but all of India and most other underdeveloped areas hungering for industrialization have already been made aware of the Soviet Union's "generous contribution." Similar highly publicized offers have been made to Burma and Egypt, among other countries.

It is this type of technical and scientific "assistance," writes the author of this article, that the Communist bloc will most probably stress in the future. The Soviet Union's primary aim is neither to trade with nor to grant aid to economically backward areas. It wants to extend its sphere of influence. And providing teams of scientists and technicians promises the Soviet Union "the highest dividends in terms of influence with the smallest capital outlay."

Some Perspectives on the Nature and Role of the Western European Communist Parties, by Bernard S. Morris, in *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April 1956), pp. 157–69.

The author of this provocative article attacks the erroneous notion still held in some quarters that the West European CP's are primarily conspiratorial movements aimed at the overthrow of "bourgeois" governments. As matters stand today "the national Communist parties . . . serve rather as adjuncts to Soviet foreign policy than as instruments of revolution. . . ." The last thing the Soviet Union wants at this time, says Mr. Morris, is the establishment of new Communist states in non-contiguous areas. While Western Communist parties have been given the green light to exploit local situations, to lead their masses along the "local road to socialism,"

. . . their purpose is not to bring Western Europe to the point of rebellion; it is instead to stimulate anti-American feeling, to make cooperation on the intergovernmental level more difficult and to induce neutralism and apathy among those who do not favor a pro-Soviet orientation. To the extent that the Communist parties can accomplish this much, they will have performed their duty toward the USSR.

This latest version of the Popular Front tactic creates a dilemma for the Western CP's. They must seek increased mass support, but at the cost of destroying their distinctive character: "the greater their following, the more emasculated their program." Yet, while the Communist parties debate the new policies, and lose numbers of active members (membership in the French CP has declined from 908,000 in 1947 to 500,000 in 1954), their success at the polls continues—a challenge to the West which must be answered, Mr. Morris concludes. The ". . . vast number of non-Communists . . . who see the Communist Party as the only party on the left openly advocating basic social and economic change without recourse to force" must be given a clear sight of the democratic road to social harmony and economic security. R. B.

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Correspondence

Editors' Note: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism*. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington 25, D. C.

THE "PARLIAMENTARY" TACTIC IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In his report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU last February, Nikita Khrushchev stated that under present world conditions ". . . the working class . . . [is afforded] the possibility of inflicting a defeat on the reactionary anti-popular forces and of gaining a firm majority in Parliament, converting it from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of genuinely popular will." As an example of this new "parliamentary" tactic, Anastas Mikoyan, on the same occasion, pointed to Czechoslovakia as a country where "the socialist revolution was carried out by peaceful means." Due to the "favorable postwar situation," said Mikoyan, Communists were able to "come to power by allying themselves not only with the parties of the working people which were close to them but also with the bourgeois parties which supported the common national front." The Czechoslovak experience teaches us, he concluded, that in some countries the "people" (read: Communists) can "win . . . in their own way, yet also without civil war."

As a Czechoslovak national who was in Prague in 1945–48, I feel obliged to caution the world that Comrade Mikoyan's "new story" is an old story indeed. The postwar Czechoslovak Parliament was "converted" into an instrument of "genuinely popular will" only by force of Communist arms and at the expense of all democratic procedures and traditions—all in the name of making it an "instrument of genuinely popular will."

How was this done? In 1945 Czechoslovakia was "liberated" from the Nazis, and the Czechoslovak Communists, working in the shadow of the occupying Red Army, gained overwhelming influence in many of the local committees of national resistance. The combined pressure of the occupation forces and the Communist-dominated local organs forced the National Front Cabinet and the President reluctantly to agree to far-reaching nationalization measures.

On the eve of the Constituent Assembly elections in May 1946, the Red Army ostentatiously moved sizable numbers of troops from Austria into Czechoslovakia. But despite this move and the growing power of local party activists, the Communist Party polled only 38 percent of the vote in the elections.

This was a very poor showing under the circumstances, and thereafter the influence and power of the Communists declined steadily. By the end of 1947 the strength of the Czech Communists had deteriorated to such an extent that the non-Communist parties were confident of making considerable gains in the elections scheduled for the early spring of 1948.

The Communists were well aware of the situation, however, and availed themselves of their strength in the Ministries of Interior and National Defense to pack the police and the army with their members. When the protests of the non-Communist majority of the Cabinet were ignored by the Communist Ministers, including the Premier, the twelve non-Communist Ministers resigned. They hoped thereby to topple the Cabinet and force new elections, which would undoubtedly have resulted in a Communist defeat. Their resignations were refused, however.

At this point the Communists abandoned all pretense of democratic procedure. They decided to use armed force. The violent *coup* of February 1948 was staged by Valerian Zorin (now Soviet Ambassador in Bonn), who had been sent from Moscow to Prague with this specific task. Strong Communist-commanded police forces were concentrated in and around the capital, the Communist-dominated factory militia were armed, mob demonstrations were arranged in the streets of Prague, the secretariats of the non-Communist parties and government ministries headed by non-Communists were invaded, and "action committees" terrorized all existing political, administrative, and economic institutions.

The ailing President, Dr. Eduard Benes, was under severe pressure from all sides. The National Assembly was prevented from meeting. Finally, on February 25, 1948, Benes was "allowed" to accept the resignation of the twelve ministers but was forced to appoint a new Communist-dominated Cabinet, in which the only non-Communists were avowed fellow-travelers. By the time the National Assembly finally met on March 10, 1948 (the day of Jan Masaryk's mysterious death), many of its members had been arrested or threatened with arrest, and others had fled the country. Between March 11 and May 6, while the Assembly was in session, a number of deputies were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested and prosecuted.

The "stable parliamentary majority" formed in this manner adopted a new election law and approved the new Constitution of May 9, 1948, which was specifically modelled on the Soviet Constitution. (Benes categorically refused to sign the Constitution and resigned on June 7, 1948.) New National Assembly elections were held on May 30, 1948, after the organization of a "regenerated" National Front including the Communists and the pro-Communist wing of the Social Democratic Party. The electorate was presented with a single list of National Front candidates, who naturally won 80 percent of the seats in the New Assembly. Such was the transformation of that body into an "instrument of genuinely popular will."

In May 1954 a new election law was passed allowing only candidates of the Communist-dominated National Front to run in local election districts. Furthermore, there was to be only one candidate in each district. When the November 1954 elections were held, the voters were herded into the election booths and given open lists of candidates. No envelopes were provided, and the voters were expected to insert their marked lists into the ballot boxes under the watchful eyes of members of the Communist-controlled election commissions. This is the manner in which the "organ of genuine democracy" presently in office in Czechoslovakia was elected!

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A detailed study of these developments should be a chastening lesson to any member of parliament in a free country where the Communists are today making overtures to other leftist parties for a common front. May they profit from such study and avoid the pitfalls hidden in Comrade Khruschchev's "new" theories of the "peaceful transition to socialism."

Washington, D. C. **Peter Zenkl**

[*Mr. Zenkl was Deputy-Premier in the Czechoslovak Cabinet from 1946–48.*]

THE USSR AND CHINA: FUTURE RIVALS

In his review of Dr. Wilhelm Starlinger's *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht* (Limits of Soviet Power, Holzner-Verlag, Kitzingen am Main, 1954) in *Problems of Communism* (Vol. IV, No. 6, p. 48 ff.), Mr. Erik Willenz subjected the book to some rather severe critical judgments. In this writer's opinion, Mr. Willenz' criticisms themselves need re-examination in the light of world developments since the fall of 1955.

Starlinger's central thesis is that Soviet Russia must eventually find itself threatened on the east by expansionist pressures from the overpopulated colossus of China and, unable to resist these pressures alone, will have to seek realignment with the West for its own protection. The author views this prospect as strengthening the West's bargaining position in negotiating with the USSR for the liberation of Soviet-enslaved East-Central Europe, which he believes can be achieved without the dread catastrophe of atomic war.

Mr. Willenz voices great skepticism concerning the whole Starlinger thesis, terming the author's alleged "invocation of the myth of racial brotherhood" weak, unconvincing, and "even dangerous." This writer, however, does not agree that Starlinger makes this the main potential keystone of a future Soviet understanding with the West. Rather, he sees the key force in the practical danger arising from the natural expansive tendencies of the Chinese human sea, which in his view will invoke a common Soviet-Western front against Chinese imperialism. This is admittedly a highly speculative peek into the future; it is *not* just a pipe-dream inspired by outmoded racist doctrines.

Fairness also demands recognition that two specific predictions made by Starlinger as corollaries to his general thesis have proven remarkably prescient. The first was that Communist China, because of unwillingness to depend wholly on the USSR for aid in carrying out industrialization, would try to "hunger through alone," squeezing the necessary surplus capital out of agriculture. Hence, predicted Starlinger in 1954, Communist China would *soon* abandon gradualism in favor of rapid, forcible collectivization. A year later, in October 1955, the Mao regime announced the first of a series of decisions successively stepping up the pace of collectivization.

Starlinger's second prediction was that the USSR, in the event that West German Chancellor Adenauer stood firm on the Western alliance, would eventually shift its tactics and negotiate with the very statesman whom, at the time Starlinger wrote, it was denouncing in terms of uncompromising hatred. This seemingly incredible prophecy likewise came true with Adenauer's visit to Moscow at Soviet invitation less than two years later.

Speaking at Aachen on May 10, Winston Churchill also discerned new hope of eventual Soviet rapprochement with the West should the present Moscow leadership's all-out repudiation of Stalin prove genuine. It seems improbable, however, that the Kremlin will be willing to pay the price of such a rapprochement—involving the liberation of East Germany and the other satellites—until *forced* to do so by imperative considerations of self-protection. The most significant and heartening aspect of Starlinger's book is that it foresees such considerations as inevitably coming into play in Soviet-Chinese relations.

Munich, Germany **Dr. Stefan Marinoff**

Mr. Willenz replies: Dr. Marinoff takes me to task for criticizing Wilhelm Starlinger's speculations on the inevitability of conflict between Communist China and the Soviet Union arising out of the former's "natural expansive tendencies." He appears to believe that Starlinger's thesis has received significant corroboration from recent developments on the international scene.

I find it difficult to accept Dr. Marinoff's reservations about my original review, and even more so his claim that certain events have bolstered the Starlinger thesis. Neither China's decision to industrialize by "squeezing the necessary surplus capital out of agriculture" nor Chancellor Adenauer's trip to Moscow last year testifies to Starlinger's "remarkable prescience" or analytical acumen. Indeed, the author's reasoning on Chinese industrialization was characteristic of the fuzziness of many of the speculations in his book.

To hold that Communist China's industrialization-via-collectivization policy was decided upon to avoid dependence upon Soviet Russia is tantamount to implying that collectivization in the Communist-bloc countries is a way of achieving ultimate freedom from Soviet domination. Nothing could be further from the case. Communist China's torturous path to industrialization was necessitated by isolation from the West and by Soviet inability to furnish the necessary capital resources, not Chinese reluctance to receive them It is more than likely that the next several years will find Mao more rather than less dependent upon Soviet Russia, though Dr. Marinoff seems to imply the opposite.

As for Chancellor Adenauer's trip to Moscow, opinions may differ as to what was achieved there, but no one has yet suggested that it spelled the kind of Soviet move toward rapprochement with the West which would fit in with Starlinger's broad terms of reference.

I still feel, therefore, that this much-discussed book, enlightening as it was as a chronicle of the author's experiences and observations in the Soviet Union, failed utterly as a sound analysis of the USSR and the future of Soviet world relations.

SOVIET LITERATURE

Mr. Walter Z. Laqueur, in his very interesting and informative article, "The 'Thaw' and After" (*Problems of Communism*, No. 1, 1956), makes a few regrettable errors of fact which I would like to see corrected.

Mr. Laqueur writes that during World War II "novels by Dostoievsky and Leskov were freely published." This is not entirely accurate with respect to Dostoievsky, and is quite incorrect with respect to Leskov. Although some selections of Dostoievsky's writings appeared, there was no separate edition of *The Brothers Karamazov*, *Possessed* or *The Idiot;* and certainly Mr. Laqueur would count these among Dostoievsky's more important works. As a matter of fact, *The Idiot* and *Possessed* have never been published under separate cover in the Soviet Union.

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In the postwar years there have been several editions of Dostoievsky's novels, among them *The Raw Youth*, *Poor Folk*, and *Crime and Punishment*. The July 1955 edition of *Crime and Punishment*, which Mr. Laqueur mentions as "the first in many years," was actually not the first postwar printing of that novel.

As for Leskov, not one of his novels has ever been published in the Soviet Union, even during the last war. Only his short stories have appeared, and Mr. Laqueur may be surprised to learn that these have been published, since the war, in more than one million copies, in Russian alone.

The Aksakov brothers, whom Mr. Laqueur also mentions, are indeed "news" in Soviet publishing, for their works had been left out of print for many years. Readers may be interested to know that one of them, Sergei, has become a very popular author in the Soviet Union, his fairy tales appearing in millions of copies.

New York City **Maurice Friedberg**

[*Mr. Friedberg is a Lecturer in Russian literature and language at Hunter College.*]

ACCOLADES

I wish to tell you at once that your review is notable in every respect, and that I follow it with the greatest interest. . . . I can only encourage you to continue the publication of a magazine which, on the ideological plane as well as in the sphere of economic and political studies, constitutes a work of the very highest order.

Paris, France **Henri Noilhan**
Member, French Academy of Agriculture

I find your magazine most informative and educative in every meaning of the two concepts. . . . The data presented in it have proved, to my experience, of inestimable value. I lecture to the miners of the Mansfield district as a tutor for the National Council of Labor Colleges (Midland Division), and your magazine has enabled me to keep them up to date in East-West sociological problems.

Nottingham, England **Edmund Taylor**

IN FUTURE ISSUES:

Moscow and Peiping—A New Stage, *by G. F. Hudson*
Is Russia Going Titoist?, *by Ernst Halpern*
The Marxist View of History, *by Hugh Trevor-Roper*
Post-Stalin Historiography, *by Alexander Dallin*
ALSO: articles by William Petersen on Soviet population policy, by Mark Field on The Soviet doctor's dilemma, by Kasimierz Grzybowski on trade unions in Communist Poland.

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